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Abstract
Roche, Jennifer Michele. Ph.D. The University of Memphis, August 2011.
Priming, Adaptation & Interpretation: Language Processing in a Social Context. Dr. Rick
Dale:
This dissertation evaluated three possible levels of processing that interlocutors
engage in during interactive discourse. The first section is a review of literature that
attempts to link priming, adaptation and interaction. The second section presents two
experiments that have been recently published in Language and Cognitive Processes.
This study evaluated the tendency for interlocutors to mimic pragmatic forms of language
during a pseudo-interaction. The third section offers three experiments that evaluated the
contexts in which communication breakdown drives disambiguation strategies. This
paper is currently under preparation and will be submitted to the Journal of Memory and
Language. The fourth section of experiments is a production and perception study that
evaluated how talker variability influences the interpretation of intent behind affective
expressions. Finally, the last section provides a general conclusion of how priming,
adaptation and interpretation may be linked during discourse. The five sections together
intend to show that priming, adaptation, and interpretation are integrative processes that
may be enlisted as cooperative mechanisms. Though these mechanisms may be
integrative, the approaches used to study them were independent in order to better assess
each mechanisms’ unique contribution to language processing.
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Priming, Adaptation & Interpretation: Language Processing in a Social Context
Chapter 1: Introduction
In the setting of interactive spoken discourse, individuals may engage a number of
internal processes that promote the ease of information sharing (e.g., Clark & Brennan,
1991; Clark & Murphy, 1982; Garrod & Pickering, 2004; Horton & Keysar, 1996;
Pickering & Garrod, 2004). Spoken discourse is created with a great deal of complexity
and interlocutors must find the most efficient method of communication. This complexity
is created by the interactions of verbal and non-verbal behaviors during any number of
possible social contexts that are presented to and reside within the communicators. To a
large extent, conversation seems to occur with ease, regardless of the many possible
communicative channels, which may be solidified by socially relevant contexts. For
example, a speaker may engage in a number of behaviors that promote social cohesion
with their conversation partner (Kraut & Johnson, 1979). The ease in information may
exist because individuals have the ability to align, adapt and interpret context specific
information during social communication (e.g., behavioral alignment, other-centric
perspectives, and pragmatic interpretation; Attardo, Eisterhold, Hay & Pogi, 2003;
Garrod & Pickering, 2004; Pickering & Garrod, 2004; Schober, 1993). Though these
processes may be somewhat independent, it should be considered that these processes are
interactive and inform each other at many levels to promote the ease in information
sharing.
The question has thus been asked: “Why is conversation so easy despite all the
information humans must encode and interpret?” Some researchers have proposed the
notion that humans are designed to process dialogue with a greater ease (Garrod &
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Pickering, 2004; Pickering & Garrod, 2004). The complexities in conversation are what
truly make dialogue so unique and so easy to maintain, even despite the nature of
mistakes that may occur during conversational interactions (e.g., Horton & Keysar,
1996). Dialogue is an intrinsically straightforward behavior that is governed by related
processing mechanisms. The investigation of processing mechanisms behind
communicative language, such as priming, adaptation, and interpretation, are needed to
show how humans interact through speech and converge through commonalities that
exist during communication. Therefore, this dissertation explores three possible
mechanisms (i.e., priming, adaptation, and interpretation) that contribute to strategies
interlocutors may enlist to make conversation as easy as possible. The following sections
will elucidate the function of each mechanism as they relate to language processing.
To begin, a priming mechanism will be considered as it relates to automatic
alignment of verbal behavior. Garrod and Pickering (2004) propose a specific
mechanistic model of dialogue to explain how individuals maintain, produce, and
comprehend dynamic exchanges of information between individuals. There are many
steps to the process that allow individuals to understand each other. In this interactive
model, at the time of listening, the individual will process phonological, syntactic and
semantic information and the listener may use these prior communicative experiences to
help with interpretation. Listeners are required to process the information available to
them, in order to help them produce an utterance that is in line with their speaker and the
existing conversation. This is an interactive exchange of representations at multiple
levels. In order for the listener to align at the different levels of linguistic information, the
speaker may prime the listener at any or all of the levels of analysis. Therefore, the
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interactive alignment model proposes that priming is the root of all alignment and it is
necessary for interlocutors to manage in order to make predictions about what they might
say next. This process seems to be a likely first step to communication, in which the
interlocutors are initially able to access information from each other that groups them
together in a socially cohesive manner.
However, there is a possibility for mistakes to occur that cause this interactive
alignment process to fail and some sort of adjustment to the context must occur in order
to maintain successful communication. When there is a break in communication or
failure to align, individuals go through self-monitoring strategies that help them repair
these mistakes (e.g., Monitoring & Adjustment; Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Horton &
Keysar, 1996). In order for this repair to occur, conversants must adapt their behavior in
such a way that allows them to continue on with their conversation. When a listener does
not comprehend the information provided s/he might attempt to salvage information to
better understand the issue at hand (e.g., via clarification question; Pickering & Garrod,
2004). This might suggest that individuals use strategies to come to an understanding in
order to make conversation work. These strategies may help individuals quickly and
easily assess the interactions that exist during conversation, without having to revisit
irrelevant information. Adaptation may also lead to the ease in interpreting pragmatic
intent, especially when the interlocutors are required to decode non-literal or cryptic
information.
Most notably, the pragmatic literature has provided valuable insight into the
nature of pragmatic expressions, in that our words might not always represent our true
intentions and it is clear that pragmatic factors during social dialogue are very important

3

(e.g., Attardo et al., 2005; Bavelas, Black, Lemery & Mullett, 2005; Kreuz & Roberts,
1995; Muecke, 1975; Rockwell, 2000). When the literal meaning is not present in the
language used, interlocutors are faced with decoding intent from other sources which
may include non-linguistic cues (e.g., affective prosody) and influence from previously
held views about their speaker (e.g., gender and race). That is, at the surface level of
language production, interlocutors should have no problem comprehending the literal
meaning of each word used, but the intent behind the words may require further
processing, especially if the intended meaning is not explicitly stated. Therefore, we use
interpretation to refer to further processing beyond basic language comprehension. If not
for the non-linguistically related socially relevant cues paired with language, one may
have difficulty interpreting the intent behind an utterance and all attempts to coordinate at
the level of verbal behavior could be lost. In order to better understand the nature of
communication, context should be considered when interpreting the effects of production
and perception. The investigation of such information may set the stage to better explain
the interpretation of pragmatic intent.
Priming may promote ease of communication because interlocutors will
interactively align with each other’s behaviors, which may promote more accurate
predictions of how to respond. However, communication sometimes breaks down and
interlocutors must monitor each other’s behaviors to repair mistakes. Adaptation may not
only be required for repair, but may also promote the interpretation of intent, especially
when the literal meaning of what is stated does not directly represent the intent behind a
speaker’s meaning. Understanding the role of each of these mechanisms is necessary to
uncover the complex and dynamic nature of communication.
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Exploring the possible mechanisms behind language production and speech
perception during communication, as an interactive process, will contribute to a better
understanding of why conversation is so easy. Priming, adaptation and interpretation are
three crucial components of communication. This is not to say that these are the only
processes involved in during communication, but that they are vital for its success. The
purpose of this dissertation proposal is to show that communication is not constrained by
a single processing mechanism, but that there are specific mechanisms that should be
better understood. In order for these mechanisms to be better understood, each of these
processes will be evaluated independently. An independent evaluation will allow for a
more explicit view of how certain mechanisms may drive communicative behavior. The
next three chapters will review a series of experiments that address issues of priming,
adaptation and interpretation during pseudo-interactive settings.
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Doubling-up on Double Meaning: Pragmatic Alignment
Chapter 2: Priming
Abstract
Garrod and Pickering (2004) maintain that conversation is easy because automatic
alignment occurs at various levels during conversation. Other related theories of
alignment have also been proposed for emotional/mood alignment (Hatfield, Cacioppo, &
Rapson, 1994). Though there is a large literature on pragmatics in discourse, there is as of
yet no experimental demonstration that this level also undergoes alignment. Two
experiments test the impact of the use of indirect language by a pseudo-confederate on
participant contributions to interaction. Overall, individuals coordinate during interaction
at the level of pragmatics (Experiment 1), and this is not explained merely by mood
inducement through content of a double meaning (Experiment 2). We discuss findings in
terms of psycholinguistic alignment and emotional contagion.
Keywords: Alignment, Language, Communication, Pragmatics
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Doubling Up on Double Meanings: Pragmatic Alignment
“When you have nothing to do and lots of time to do it, come on up,” is a classic
use of indirect language by Mae West (Cowan & Cline, 1940). Mae West was infamous
for her use of indirect language to counteract censorship of a sexual nature during the
early 1940s film industry. For example, Mae West made no secret of her intentions to
promote herself sexually. She even publicly stated, “It isn't what I do, but how I do it. It
isn't what I say, but how I say it, and how I look when I do it and say it,” (Chandler,
2009). She capitalized on her audience’s ability to successfully interpret her intent from
the use of paralinguistic and non-verbal cues to spoken sexual innuendo to counteract
reprisal from censorship laws (Failler, 2001). The use of indirect language was central to
Mae West’s triumph over 1940s cinematic industry. As language users, it is not only
entertaining, but also common and useful for interlocutors to integrate indirect language
during colloquial communication. The purpose of the study presented here is to
determine whether, when we hear indirect language from a conversation partner, we may
also come to use indirect language and align pragmatically during dialogue. In short, we
test whether conversation partners could be primed to be as conversationally “cheeky” as
Mae West.
Currently, there has been a growing research agenda to identify this sort of joint
action between interlocutors during dialogue. However, much of our understanding of
language and dialogue has often been based on studies of single language processors
(e.g., single word/sentence production and comprehension in text/monologue; Bock,
1986; Potter & Lombardi, 1990). While this is a powerful simplifying assumption,
natural language is learned and most often occurs in the context of social interactions
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(Clark, 1992). This has been a longstanding concern (e.g., Clark, 1975), and recent
growth in this research seeks to find a mechanistic account for the great ease with which
humans process dialogue.
In one prominent example, Garrod and Pickering (2004) have proposed a model
of interactive alignment to explain the possible mechanisms behind the effortless nature
of conversation. Interactive alignment theory characterizes the emergence of shared or
“aligned” representations between interlocutors when information is coordinated at
various linguistic levels (e.g., phonological, syntactic, and semantic) to promote
coordination with his/her conversation partner. One mechanism of alignment in this
theory is that the speaker will routinely prime his/her listener across these levels during
interaction. Once alignment occurs, it may help the speaker form predictions about how
to respond during future spoken utterances (Pickering & Garrod, 2009). These
predictions provide ways to more efficiently produce and comprehend speech without
overloading the cognitive system. In short, alignment permits strengthened
comprehension through growing “implicit common ground” (Pickering & Garrod, 2004,
p. 10), in which undergirding active prediction may facilitate future comprehension and
potential recovery from any interactive misalignment.
Though the present literature on alignment in dialogue has revealed shared
representations and processes at various linguistic and paralinguistic levels during
interaction, (e.g., words or syntax and speech rates, utterance durations, response
latencies, pause durations and vocalizations: Brennan & Clark, 1996; Branigan,
Pickering, & Cleland, 2000; Cappella & Planalp, 1981; Chapple, 1982; Loehr, 2007)
there still remains relatively less research on the alignment of pragmatics during spoken
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language (e.g., interpretation and implementation of non-literal intent). The integration
of linguistic and paralinguistic information naturally promotes a deeper understanding
when a spoken statement is not syntactically clear (Snedeker & Yuan, 2008). For
example, Bavelas et al. (1986) note that a key component in communication is that
“[w]e don’t always say what we mean, and often don’t mean what we say.” (p. 6). It
should be considered that much of spoken language is characterized not only by the
words we use, but also the way in which words are spoken (Nygaard & Lunders, 2002;
Snedeker & Yuan, 2008). Paralinguistic contributions to communication are necessary
to understand how conversation partners process spoken language, especially when the
linguistic message is unclear. It is possible that priming, one core mechanism of
interactive alignment, with low/mid-level linguistic representations (words, phrase
options, etc.) and paralinguistic cues to the intent of spoken language should lead to
alignment at the pragmatic level during dialogue (Garrod & Pickering, 2004). During
alignment, interlocutors form predictions to prevent miscommunication, which in turn
may promote cohesion and decrease social distance between speakers (Giles & Ogay,
2007). If linguistic and paralinguistic information are actively integrated to promote
high-level linguistic processes like pragmatic intent, a crucial component of daily
language, then one should expect that pragmatic intent may align in similar ways.
In this paper, our goal is to demonstrate alignment of indirect language. Indirect
language here refers to any form of pragmatic discourse that broadly represents any type
of statement that has at least one literal meaning and one non-literal meaning. For
example, if a speaker were to produce the statement “Oh, what a gloomy day”, on a
sunny day, a listener could interpret the speaker’s intent in at least one of two ways. The
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literal interpretation would be that the speaker thinks it is a gloomy day. The non-literal
interpretation would be that it is actually a nice day, but the speaker intends to be
playfully ironic. Verbal irony is a typical form of pragmatics that often relies on the
contribution of paralinguistic information (e.g., joyful intonation with negative
language) in spoken language. It has often been defined as meaning something other
than what is literally stated or in complete opposition to what was explicitly stated (e.g.,
Brown & Levinson, 1987; Grice, 1975). It has also been compared to sarcasm, and some
claim that irony and sarcasm may be difficult to separate, and therefore should be
discussed as similar processes (Eisterhold, Attardo, & Boxer, 2006; Gibbs, 2000).
However, some researchers have suggested that the use of such a definition fails to
characterize the true nature of verbal irony (Bryant & Foxtree, 2002; Wilson & Sperber,
1992). Though verbal irony has been defined in various ways, this form of pragmatics
often relies heavily on the contribution of paralinguistic cues to intent of the speaker
(e.g., tone of voice or prosody, Clark & Gerrig, 1984; Rockwell, 2000). We will use the
term indirect language (IL) to refer to many types of indirect speech acts that may have
a double meaning (i.e., literal and non literal meanings). This term was chosen because
the issue at hand explores the alignment of indirect contextual statements in general
rather than a specific type of indirect speech act (e.g., simile, sarcasm, or irony).
Also, interlocutors are not likely to use only one type of IL; rather they may use
an array during dialogue (Gibbs, 2006). The individuals involved in the conversation
must interpret intent during indirect contexts because they are aware of their partner’s
discourse goals, rather than applying a “rhetorical label” to their partner’s statements
(Kreuz, 2000). When the IL fails, the listener may ignore the speech act because the
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pragmatic goal was never realized. Yet, when talkers use IL, they may provide a number
of cues related to pragmatic intent that prevent their pragmatic goal from failing.
To date, there has been a large body of research evaluating pragmatics in
discourse (e.g., for background see: Attardo, 2001; Austin, 1962; Bryant & Foxtree,
2002; Clark, 1996; Clark & Gerrig, 1984; Eisterhold et al., 2006; Grice, 1989; Kreuz &
Glucksberg, 1989; Sperber & Wilson, 2005; Stalnaker, 1970). In spite of this, perhaps
surprisingly, the alignment of a dialogue’s pragmatics has been scarcely examined. While
the processing of pragmatic information likely encompasses the encoding/decoding of
word choice, syntax, and prosody, the interpretation of intent may change given the
context in which it is expressed. For instance, take the “gloomy day” example from
above, the listener that hears “It’s a gloomy day” with no contextual grounding may
interpret the statement as literal, when in fact it was meant to be non-literal.
Consequently, the listener must decode all levels of production in order to interpret
information that was not explicitly stated (i.e., pragmatics is not necessarily just the sum
of its lower-level parts).
The purpose of this study is to add to the current literature evaluating pragmatics
by examining its usage during dynamic interactions. If interlocutors have the ability to
align their prosody, words and syntax, they should also understand the pragmatics of a
speaker’s statements, which leads to alignment at the pragmatic level. The current study
assesses the alignment of pragmatics by priming interlocutors with IL in hopes to induce
reciprocal exchanges. It should be noted, the purpose of this study is not to determine
how any specific paralinguistic cue or form of indirect language could be used in
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conversation settings, rather the study attempts to find reciprocal behaviors at this
pragmatic level.
Experiment 1
The purpose of the first experiment is to determine the effect of priming IL on
participant contributions during a pseudo-interaction. A pseudo-interaction represents a
scenario in which participants believe they are exchanging verbal information with
another person, though they in fact do not interact with a real person, but respond to prerecorded scripted statements as if it were a real person. When participants are primed
with IL from the pseudo-confederate, participants should then produce more statements
with a double meaning (e.g., literal and non-literal).
Method
Participants
Participants included 27 University of Memphis undergraduate students (mean
age = 19.48 years; 23 females). Twenty-six were native speakers of American English,
but one participant was a native speaker of African Swahili. S/he was not an outlier and
was retained for analysis. All participants reported normal to corrected vision and no
hearing/speech impairments. All methods were in accordance with the ethical standards
of the responsible committee on human experimentation and with the Helsinki
Declaration of 1975, as revised in 1983.
Materials
The experiment took place in a private laboratory room. Participants were seated
at a comfortable distance from a 20-inch iMac computer screen. A Razor Barracuda
noise-reducing headset/microphone was used to present and record acoustic data.
12

MATLAB PsychToolbox-3 programs (Brainard, 1997) controlled stimulus presentation
and recorded participant responses for the conversation and rating tasks.
Stimuli
The experimental stimuli consisted of fifteen celebrity pictures collected from the
2005-2007 worst-dressed celebrity lists, from TMZ.com (see Figure 1a for a display of a
subset of celebrity pictures). All celebrity pictures were presented individually on a black
background in the middle of the 20-inch computer screen (see Figure 1b for an example
of the experimental display). Ten pseudo-confederate statements were scripted for each
of the worst-dressed celebrity pictures. The pseudo-confederate, a Caucasian female
speaker, was instructed to produce the pre-scripted expressions that coincided with the
specific celebrity picture, based on her own understanding of neutral, exaggerated
(slightly humorous with oscillating amplitude and F0 throughout the signal) and/or
understated (relatively flat intonational pattern) IL prosody. The designation of the
talker’s expressions were intentionally expressed humorously or flatly in order to provide
variability in the productions, because participants in a pilot study perceived the
productions much more unfavorably when they only heard one type of double meaning
marked by a specific acoustic intonation.
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Figure 1. A) The adjusted 590 x 915 pixel worst dressed celebrity stimulus pictures. B)
An example of the screen participants viewed when responding to a celebrity picture.

For example, one statement a participant could have heard from the pre-recorded
female talker was “Her head looks like an olive on a toothpick” (see Figure 1b for the
matching image). The literal interpretation is that her head is an olive and her body is a
toothpick. In reality, this is not possible, so the other possible interpretation would be that
she has a relatively large head for such a small body. Therefore, the double meaning here
refers to the literal interpretation based on the semantic production or the non-literal
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interpretation that is used to provide an extra piece of information to express a criticism
in a humorous way without being overly negative.
One script was created for the IL statements, which required the female talker to
produce a total of 75 statements with double meaning in an exaggerated and understated
tone of voice (i.e., resulting in 150 total possible ILs). The female talker was also
required to produce 75 scripted neutral statements (general descriptions). This resulted in
a total of 225 utterances (i.e., 3 prosodic variations x 5 statements per picture x 15
pictures; Hancock, 2004; see Figure 1a and Table 1 for a sample of the experimental
pictures and statements).

Table 1
Sample of Pseudo-confederate Statements.
Statement
Indirect Language
Connotation

“Her head looks like an olive on a
toothpick.”

Literal

“She is wearing a black jacket.”

Since only one script existed for the each of the 75 IL statements, the prosodic
variations of exaggerated and understated statements were never repeated for a single
picture during an experimental condition. Also, in a pilot experiment, the researchers
found that overly persistent presence of IL prosody disrupted participants’ performance
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in a similar task because they found it unpleasant or “annoying.” Therefore, blocks of
trials were created to include a mixture of the IL (both exaggerated and understated) and
neutral statements, with the amount of neutral statements in different proportions (see
Table 2 for proportion distributions).

Table 2
The Proportion of Indirect Language for each Condition (Beginning, Middle and End) by
Block (Image 1-5, 6-10, and 11-15).
Block

Connotation

Beginning

Middle

End

Beginning

0.67

0.33

0

Middle

0

0.67

0.33

End

0

.33

0.67

Each pseudo-confederate utterance was sampled at 44.1 kHz, 16-bit sampling
rate. The pre-scripted statements were recorded by statement type (i.e., either
exaggerated, understated or neutral), which produced amplitude differences between
sound files. Consistent with many speech production/perception studies, the sound
stimuli were equated for RMS amplitude to control for subjective perceived loudness.
This allowed the researchers to set the listening volume to a comfortable listening level.
Additionally, presenting stimuli with unequal loudness could provide unwanted
16

perceptual cuing to the purpose of the task. Varying loudness could indicate the
statements were pre-recorded or perceived as coming from a different source if the
overall amplitude was not the same.
Of the 225 pre-recorded scripted statements, 75 IL and/or neutral comments were
pseudo-randomly selected and retained for the experimental sessions. The selected
utterances were then distributed within three blocks consisting of 25 utterances each, and
differed by the proportion of IL (e.g., 2/3, 1/3, and 0, see Table 2 for condition
distribution). The distributions of IL created three experimental conditions in which
participants were randomly assigned before the experimental session. These conditions
were expressed in terms of the block with the higher proportion, 2/3 being in the
beginning, middle, or end blocks. These distributions were chosen to provide a natural
exchange of IL and to never inundate participants with IL for any given picture.
Procedure
To begin, the participant was seated next to a Caucasian female confederate while
completing the informed consent, but separated during the experimental sessions. A
Caucasian female confederate was chosen, because the pseudo-confederate was a
Caucasian female. This is an important distinction to make, because much of talker
variability is related to the perception of race and gender (Ryalls, Zipprer, & Bauldauff,
1997; Walton & Orlikoff, 1994), and because the student population at the University of
Memphis is quite diverse, making such cues readily recognizable. Therefore, it was
important to have the live confederate match the race and gender of the pseudoconfederate to promote the believability of having a real interaction. Participants were
instructed that they will discuss celebrity pictures with another participant, but would be
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separated during the experiment. This instruction was further explained as a measure to
obtain uncontaminated auditory recordings, because when having a conversation, people
often speak over each other. The participant was then told that s/he would be viewing the
same pictures as his/her partner, and his/her partner would begin the experiment because
she had been viewing the first picture longer. The participant was then informed that they
were not limited in what they could say and there were no correct or incorrect answers.
During the first task, the participant and pseudo-confederate took turns describing
each of the 15 celebrity images (i.e., 10 statements per picture; 5 participant and 5
pseudo-confederate). After each pseudo-confederate response, the participant received a
visual and auditory prompt to indicate his/her turn (see Figure 1b for an example of the
visual prompt). The visual prompt was presented in text form, to instruct the participants
how to maneuver through the experiment: “Your partner has finished. It is your turn.
Please speak clearly and press the spacebar when you are finished.” Participants also
received an auditory cue, in the form of a beep at the beginning of each trial to indicate
when they could start speaking. Each pseudo-confederate statement had a 2s delay before
its presentation to imply she was thinking about the picture and how to respond. Once the
first task was completed, the participant was asked a number of questions (see Measures
section below).
During the second task, participants were asked to code their own comments as
having another meaning other than what was explicitly stated (irony was used as an
example to aid in self-coding), or as a literal statement. IL consisted of, but was not
limited to, sarcasm, rhetorical questions, and/or a simile, while statements with only one
meaning included descriptions, non-sarcastic insults, and/or agreement statements
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(Roberts & Kreuz, 1994). Crucially, at the time of coding, the participant utterances with
the paired celebrity image were randomly presented to prevent order effects.
Measures
At the end of the first task, participants were asked if s/he: 1) perceived
statements with double meanings? (88.9% perceived), 2) produced statements with
double meaning? (92.5% produced), and 3) produced statements with double meaning
when their partner did? (74% aligned). Upon completion of task 1 (pseudo-interaction)
and 2 (self-coding), the confederate and participant were reseated together for debriefing
and asked: “Did you feel you were having a conversation with this person?” (59.3%
deceived). Though this shows a low deception rate, it may have been due to demand
characteristics related to the way the experimenter asked about the deception. Since the
scenario was somewhat unnatural, less fluid and interactive than a real conversation,
participants may have felt the conversation was not “real” or natural, but did believe they
were speaking to a real person. More recently, the researchers have found that asking
participants, “Would you be surprised if I told you that you were not really talking to the
person (confederate) sitting next to you?” is a better indicator of deception, and has
revealed deception rates higher than 90% (Roche, Caucci, Dale, & Kreuz, 2010).
The participant codes were subsequently evaluated, and revealed that the rating
task was rather difficult for some participants. Therefore, an expert coder re-coded each
participant response based on the definitions above (see Table 3 for kappa scores).
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Table 3
Kappa, Kappa Max, and % Kappa Max Between Participant (P) x Expert (E) and Expert
x Blind (B) Coder.

Coder

!

! max

%! max

PxE

0.65

0.95

68%

E x Btime1

0.39

0.46

84.5%

E x Btime2

0.74

0.88

83.5%

The codes that differed between participant/expert rater were retained and
randomly presented to a blind rater. As a note, kappa was somewhat low, but well within
the range of kappa max. When the distributions of codes are not equal, the amount of
possible agreement will be low. Bakeman and Deckner (2007) demonstrated that
evaluating the maximum possible kappa might be useful when the coding distributions
are not equal because it is not limited by the constraints of the imposed marginals. Since
kappas were low, measures were taken to improve the coding scheme in Experiment 2 for
participants to increase agreement with the expert and blind coders (see changes under
Experiment 2). Thus, the raters were retrained on 10% of the existing disagreed upon
statements. The expert and blind coder recoded the remaining statements separately. The
raters together (for 100% agreement) determined the last 2% of the responses that did not
induce agreement. We thus had two sources of coding to identify the presence of ILs
(participant self-coders and expert/blind coders). We conducted analyses on these sources
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separately to ensure that any patterns obtained are consistent across both and not unique
to one.
Results
The probability of IL from participants and expert/blind coder ratings was placed in a 3
(Condition: beginning, middle, or end) x 3 (Block: beginning, middle and end) mixed
repeated measures fixed effects model with a CSH (compound symmetry heterogeneous)
covariance structure. Participant data from both deceived and not deceived individuals
are reported because there were no significant differences in response distributions
between these groups (see General Discussion). This variance/covariance structure was
chosen because it best represented the data. Post hoc adjusted bonferroni paired
comparisons were used to evaluate any significant main effects and interactions.
Participant Ratings
The Type (3) test of fixed effects revealed a significant main effect for Block
[F(2, 27.72) = 16.29, p < .001] and a Condition x Block interaction [F(4, 27.72) = 4.67, p
< .005; see Figure 2a]. The paired comparisons for the main effect of Block revealed that
the highest probability of IL occurred in the middle block relative to the beginning (p <
.001) and end blocks (p < .05). There was a higher probability of IL in the end block
compared to the beginning (p < .005). The Condition x Block interaction revealed that the
middle condition had a significantly higher probability of IL in the middle block relative
to the beginning (p < .001) and end blocks (p < .05). Similarly, the end condition
received a higher probability of IL in the end block than the beginning block (p < .001).
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Figure 2. A) Means and standard errors for the proportion of indirect language as coded
by the participants, B) Means and standard errors for the proportion of indirect language
as rated by the Coders.

Expert/Blind Coder
The Type (3) test of fixed effects revealed a significant main effect for Condition
[F(2, 10.81) = 4.89, p < .05] and Block [F(2, 30.99) = 12.30, p < .001] with a Condition x
Block interaction [F(4, 30.99)= 7.04, p < .001, see Figure 2b]. Post hoc paired
comparisons of IL between conditions revealed a significantly higher probability of IL in
the beginning condition relative to the end condition (p < .05). Comparisons for block
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across all conditions revealed a higher probability of ILs in the middle blocks relative to
the beginning (p < .01) and end blocks (p < .05). The Condition x Block interaction
revealed that the beginning condition had a significantly higher probability of ILs in the
beginning and middle blocks relative to the end block (p < .05). The middle condition
received a higher probability of IL in the middle block relative to the beginning (p <
.001). Finally, the end condition received a higher probability of ILs in the end block than
the beginning and middle blocks (p < .005, p < .001, respectively).
Discussion
Experiment 1 examined the contribution of a pragmatic prime, indirect spoken
language, during a pseudo-interaction. This type of language makes use of non-literal
dialogue with intentions that go beyond a literal semantic interpretation. The results of
this study suggest that a participant’s dialogue is highly affected by the perception of
indirect language during a pseudo-interaction. “Implicit common ground” was
established between the participant and pseudo-confederate via shared visual context.
Providing this shared visual context allowed participants to be more readily able to
exchange IL during the interaction because precedence was set through a pattern of
preexisting/shared social knowledge.
As seen in Figure 2, coders had a higher proportion of IL judgments than
participants. This may have been due to difficulty some participants had in categorizing
their own statements. It should be noted that only the rating task was challenging for
participants, because it was difficult for them to apply the generalized definitions that
were provided before the coding session. All participants said the production of the
descriptions during the pseudo-interaction was rather easy. Also, during the experimental
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task, they did not seem to be cognitively aware that their behavior mimicked the behavior
of the pseudo-confederate, until they were queried about the behavior at the end of the
first task. Instead, as consistent with many emotion research categorization paradigms,
participants had a difficult time rating their own statements, mainly because the
definitions initially provided to them were rather general and abstract, and unusual for
them to consider meta-linguistically (Graesser et al., 2006). This problem was addressed
in Experiment 2, by providing more explicit descriptions of the categories.
Regardless of the difference between the participants and coders, the overall
trends in the data provided the same interpretation: Experiment 1 provides evidence of
pragmatic alignment in both the participant and coder ratings. The main effect of
Condition (coder) reveals that alignment may have been stronger at the beginning of the
conversation because participants were primed early on in the conversation. This
demonstrates that residual effects of the prime persisted longer for the beginning
condition relative to the end condition. The main effect of Block simply represents the
overall higher percentage of ILs participants received during the middle of each
conversation. This resulted in unaffected means in the lower IL proportion blocks, as
seen in the tails of the beginning and end conversation conditions. The effect of
alignment is most evident in the Condition x Block interaction, where an increased
probability of ILs occurred given a higher concentration of double meaning primes from
the pseudo-confederate. Even though participants received some form of indirect
language throughout the entirety of the experiment, the distribution of indirect language
provided by the participants reflects the patterns produced by the pseudo-confederate, in
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general showing that the prime had a systematic impact on how participants responded
during the pseudo-interaction.
Experiment 2
A theory similar to interactive alignment has been proposed in the emotion literature.
Emotional contagion involves shared affect-related representations or states. Affective
cues to another person’s emotions could promote the convergence of similar state
representations that may similarly simplify or facilitate dialogue (Bono & Ilies, 2006;
Hattfield et al., 1993; Hsee, Hatfield, Carlson, & Chemtob, 1990; Neumann & Strack,
2000). An individual’s affect may change depending on cues related to the valence of
their conversation partner’s actions and language. Research in this domain has argued
that emotional contagion occurs if the individual automatically mimics and synchronizes
with another person’s affective cues, thus converging on each other emotionally.
This theory is similar to Garrod and Pickering’s (2004) position, in that we not
only use linguistic information to make conversation easier, but may also allow speakers
to decode pragmatic intent from the emotional cues interlocutors produce. Indeed, the
results from Experiment 1 may have simply been due to the alignment of an affect-related
cue: The valence (almost always humorous in this context) of the ILs themselves. As a
control experiment, the purpose of Experiment 2 is to examine the influence of any such
mood contagion on pragmatic alignment, and partly replicate the findings of Experiment
1.
The purpose of priming mood was to check the humorous nature of the IL
statements as the primary influence on participant responses, rather than IL itself. This
was accomplished by inducing a humorous mood prior to the experimental session (see
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Materials for a description). This was done to test for possible influences from preexisting mood prior to the task. The idea was to induce humor in all participants to see if
responses in Experiment 1 were simply due to the inducement of a positive mood rather
than the inducement of IL. If the effect of pragmatic alignment found in Experiment 1
was merely due to mood, then the induced positive mood should have an effect on the
levels of pragmatic alignment during Experiment 2. That is, there should be a change in
the probability of responding with IL at the beginning of the conversation relative to
Experiment 1.
Method
Participants
Participants included 16 undergraduate students (mean age = 20.25 years; 11
females). All participants reported having normal to corrected vision, and no reports of
hearing or speech impairments. All methods were in accordance with the ethical
standards of the responsible committee on human experimentation and with the Helsinki
Declaration of 1975, as revised in 1983.
Materials & Stimuli
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, with 2 exceptions. Participants were
presented with a 2.37min clip1 of a comedic satire before the experimental session to
induce a humorous mood. The comedic satire mainly controlled for and allowed for the
assessment of whether participant responses were merely due to their own internal mood
states. The clip was rated 6.8 on a 10-point Likert scale (1 = not funny, 10 = extremely
funny). The conditions evaluated during this experiment were limited to the beginning
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

A scene from a popular British comedy show (“Lauren in French Class” from The Catherine Tate
Show) found on youtube.com. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zV1zK8zRCPo).

26

and end conditions. The strength of Experiment 1’s effects show that these two extremes
should be sufficient to reproduce the basic findings, thus requiring fewer participants.
Procedure
The instructions to the participants were identical to Experiment 1, but a video
clip was presented. Therefore, before the experimental interaction task began, the
participant was asked to view the humorous video clip while the confederate was being
instructed about the task in a different room.
During the second task, participants were again asked to code their own
comments as having a double meaning. Since the rating task was rather difficult for some
participants in Experiment 1, definitions and examples of possible sub-categories were
provided for IL and literal statements. This was done to increase the understanding of
what each category meant (see Table 4 for the descriptions).
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Table 4
Sub-category Examples of Indirect Language [Sarcasm, Simile, Rhetorical Question
(R?)] and Literal (Description, Non-Sarcastic Insult [Insult (NS), Agreement]
Statements.

Indirect Language

Literal

Type

Statement

Sarcasm

“Nice dress,” if the dress was ugly.

Simile

“She looks like a peacock.”

R?

“What was she thinking?”

Description

“She is wearing a dress.”

Insult(NS)

“She is ugly.”

Agreement

“Yeah, I agree.”

Measures
At the end of the first task, participants were asked if s/he: 1) perceived
statements with double meaning? (100% perceived), 2) produced statements with double
meaning? (93.75% produced), and 3) produced double meaning when their partner did?
(81.25% aligned). Upon completion of both tasks, the confederate and participant were
seated together for debriefing and asked: “Did you feel like you were speaking with this
person?” (56.2% deceived).
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Identical to Experiment 1, expert and blind coders re-coded each participant
response based on the definitions above (see Table 5 for kappa, kappa max, and % kappa
max).

Table 5
Obtained Values of Kappa, Kappa Max and % Kappa Max Between Participant (P) x
Expert (E) and Expert x Blind (B) Coders.

Coder

!

! max

%! max

PxE

0.71

0.92

77.4%

E x Btime1

0.22

0.32

68%

E x Btime2

0.68

0.89

76%

!
Results
The 2 (Condition; beginning or end) x 3 (Block; beginning, middle, and end)
analysis for Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1. Participant data from both
deceived and not deceived individuals are reported because there were no significant
differences in response distributions between these individuals (see General Discussion).
Participant Ratings
The Type (3) test of fixed effects revealed a significant main effect for Block
[F(2, 24.30) = 4.80, p < .02] and a Condition x Block interaction [F(4, 24.30)= 15.99, p
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< .001, see Figure 3a]. Post hoc paired comparisons of Block revealed a higher
probability of IL in middle block than the beginning (p < .05). The Condition x Block
interaction revealed that the beginning condition had a significantly higher probability of
IL for beginning and middle blocks relative to end block (both, p < .05). Similarly, the
end condition received a higher probability of IL for middle and end blocks than
beginning block (p < .005; p < .001, respectively).
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Figure 3. A) Means and standard errors for the proportion of indirect language as coded
by participants, B) Means and standard errors for the proportion of indirect language for
the Coder ratings.

Expert/Blind Coder
The Type (3) test of fixed effects revealed a significant main effect for Block
[F(2, 24.96) = 8.35, p < .005] and a Condition x Block interaction [F(4, 24.96)= 10.37, p
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< .001, see Figure 3b]. Post hoc paired comparisons of Block revealed a higher
probability of IL in middle block than the beginning (p < .001) and end blocks (p = .05).
The Condition x Block interaction revealed that the beginning condition had a
significantly higher probability of IL for the middle blocks relative to end block (p <
.005). Similarly, the end condition received a higher probability of IL for middle and end
blocks than beginning block (p < .005; p < .001, respectively).
The final analysis conducted was used to evaluate the probability of IL
responding between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. A 2 (Experiment: no Video or
Video) x 2 (Condition: beginning or end) x 3 (Block: beginning, middle and end) mixed
fixed/random effects model with a first order auto-regressive (AR1) variance/covariance
structure, with experiment, condition and participant held as random factors was used to
evaluate the proportion of IL use between Experiment 1 and 2. This model revealed that
there was no significant Experiment main effect [F(1, 18.859) = .136, p = .717] and no
significant Experiment x Condition [F(1, 20.243) = .253, p = .633], [Experiment x Block
[F(2, 59.663) = .460, p = .633], and Experiment x Condition x Block interactions [F(2,
59.663) = .598, p = .553]. The results from this study show that there were no significant
differences in participant responding between the two experiments. This suggests that the
effect of IL use was not merely due to a humorous mood inducement.
Additional Analysis: Temporal Lag of Primes
We combined data from both experiments to investigate the time course of the
priming of IL. The 75 utterances of the pseudo-confederate, and those generated by
participants in the task, may be treated as a time series of utterances, having the property
of IL or not. We used categorical cross-recurrence analysis (Dale & Spivey, 2006;
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Richardson & Dale, 2005), a technique that permits quantifying the leading/following
patterns during sequences of behavioral events. For example, Richardson and Dale
(2005) used this method to quantify the temporal lag required for listener eye-movements
to “catch up” to a speaker’s own eye-movements.
In the same analysis here, we found that participants’ IL indeed lagged behind the
primes across participants in both experiments. Using a window of lags between -10
(primes lead) and 10 (participant leads), cross-recurrence showed that maximum “match”
between participants and pseudo-confederate occurred at a lag of approximately -2
statements (one-sample t(42) = -2.3, p < .05). This suggests that if the stimulus sequence
contained 2 prime statements of IL, the participant coupled to this pragmatic intent. This
analysis provides further evidence that participants are aligning through priming, as
priming predicts this temporal lag relation between recordings and participant utterances.
It also suggests that the “optimal” time to align pragmatically is not immediately after
one’s interlocutor offers IL, but instead after an intervening utterance (lag 2).
Discussion
Emotional contagion refers to the alignment or synchronization of emotional cues
with another person. The current experiment attempted to induce a humorous mood
before the experimental session, in order to determine if this would affect the
participants’ behavior during the session. However, the moderate humor ratings for the
video clip may have contributed to the non-significant effect of emotional contagion. Yet
Experiment 2 did replicate the basic findings of Experiment 1, with the exception of
finding a main effect of Condition. This shows that the initiation of IL in the beginning
condition of Experiment 2 did not have as strong of an effect as it did in Experiment 1.
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Since there were no significant differences between Experiments 1 and 2, the direct
replication of Experiment 1 does imply that regardless of the attempts to induce a mood,
there was clear evidence of alignment at the pragmatic level. Participant and coder ratings
were relatively similar (see Figures 2 and 3), suggesting a more detailed description of
the subcategories was helpful. Participant responses reflected similar patterns as the
pseudo-confederate in both conditions. This reveals that the pragmatic prime had a
significant impact on how participants responded during the pseudo-conversation.
Overall, participants coordinated their pragmatics with the pseudo-confederate, and not
simply in response to the humorous mood induced by the video.
General Discussion
Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that members of an interaction align pragmatically
with their discourse partner. These findings are consistent with previous research
exploring interactive alignment at other linguistic levels (see Garrod & Pickering, 2004
for a review). However, this effect is somewhat inconsistent with some current
pragmatics literature. For example, Dress, Kreuz, Link, and Caucci, (2008) obtain results
suggesting many individuals from the southern United States often refrain from using
indirect language, specifically sarcasm, in novel social situations because it has a strong
negative connotation in the regional dialect. One may be tempted to attribute this to the
oft-cited theory that there is a higher propensity for umbrage within the southern United
States (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Therefore, “southerners” may intend to prevent conflict
or even violence by adhering to social politeness and hospitality (Cohen, Vandello,
Puente, & Rantilla, 1999). Yet, if a speaker successfully implements a pragmatic goal
(e.g., to be humorous in a sarcastic manner) during conversation, the listener is obligated
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to decode the speaker’s intent resulting in, for example, a now-accepted use of the double
meaning (Attardo, 2001; Sperber & Wilson, 2004). Also, if the listener wishes to
continue the conversation or prevent offending their conversation partner, they are likely
to accommodate his/her communication to the speaker (Giles & Ogay, 2007).
When participants activate their partner’s pragmatic strategy, such as humorous
sarcasm, the probability of responding in a similar way should grow. This is evident in
the IL distributions provided by the participants (e.g., participant ILs increase/decrease
when the pseudo-confederate’s IL increase/decreases). This process may be automatic if
the participants were not conscious of why they were mimicking their partner’s behavior.
Interlocutors may not consciously realize that aligning with their conversation partner
could naturally reduce social distance during communication. The evidence does not
imply that the process of alignment is immediate, because IL accumulated over blocks of
exposure (see Figures 2 and 3 and discussion of temporal lag results). If the listener’s
behavior is constrained by social etiquette, then time may be necessary for the
recognition of acceptable responses to violations of social rules. Once these violations are
assessed, then interlocutors may be more readily able to integrate the existing pragmatic
strategy. This notion is most evident in the current participant data, where carry-over
effects of the IL were exhibited during the blocks with no ILs presented to the participant.
More specifically, under novel conversational scenarios, an individual from the southern
United States may never elicit an indirect pragmatic goal, because it is socially
unacceptable to do so. However, the pragmatic goal was forcefully implemented in these
experiments to allow the participant to adopt and maintain the strategy of the pseudoconfederate, which may have normally been taboo or inappropriate when interacting with
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an unfamiliar conversation partner. In short, when participants were highly primed for
these specific pragmatic goals, s/he was provided with a now socially acceptable strategy
of responding.
During interaction, if any of the levels of alignment conflict, then listeners may
seek to confirm a speaker’s intent – of course, pragmatic goals can and do fail in daily
conversation. The alignment model can also potentially explain recovery from possible
failures. During conversation, individuals may self-monitor in order to repair mistakes
(Horton & Keysar, 1996). If a listener does not comprehend intent, s/he will attempt to
seek further information to better align, such as through clarification questions (Pickering
& Garrod, 2004). For example, if a statement is not perceived as having two possible
meanings, and thus appears anomalous, a repair strategy can be enlisted to remedy the
inconsistency (e.g., seeking a possible pragmatic explanation for a literally false or
unusual statement).
Such breakdowns relate directly to a limitation of the current study. For example,
pragmatic alignment may have been hindered due to the only partially interactive nature
of the task. The pseudo-interaction scenario was perceived as non-natural by some of the
participants, but as expected, all participants interacted with the pseudo-confederate by
using agreement statements or asking questions (e.g., responding “are you serious? or
“yeah, I agree”; cf. Holtgraves, Ross, Waywadt, & Han, 2007). It could be that asking
questions and using agreement statements may very well be related to repair strategies.
Also, upon further analysis, there were no significant differences in the probability of
producing a statement with double meaning between the individuals who were deceived
and not. This might suggest that participants who did not report being deceived may have
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actually been reporting that the task was artificial. The lack of any performance
difference between the two groups indicates this may hold true. Other studies have been
conducted to correct this flaw in probing for deception, and found indeed that deception
rates using the same confederate setup can approach ceiling if probed properly (Roche et
al., 2010).
Interestingly, some participants attributed the artificiality of the conversation to
the pseudo-confederate’s refusal to acknowledge his/her comments. This may have also
prevented the participant from implementing his/her own pragmatic goals, thus forcing
the listener to adopt the pragmatic rule of the pseudo-confederate. This irregular way of
interacting may have led to moderate effects of alignment because the participant was
prevented from dynamically implementing other conversational strategies. In a natural
conversational setting, individuals can enlist other forms of pragmatics and relevant cues
to intent (e.g., humor, jokes). For example, Attardo (2001) maintains that humor, irony
and sarcasm are closely related, but the perlocutionary act is different. Also, Bryant and
Fox Tree (2002) suggest that during spontaneous speech interlocutors are able to decode
intent when acoustic cues are presented, especially when context is lacking.
Another limitation of this study was the way in which emotional contagion was
evaluated. There was no effect on immediate pragmatic usage when mood was induced.
However, there may have been some level of emotional alignment during the course of
the pseudo-conversation. If the participants produced similar behavioral (e.g., acoustic)
cues related to the emotional intent of the pseudo-confederate, emotional contagion may
have in fact occurred. Most notably, mood inducement and emotional contagion should
not have been separated, but integrated. The evaluation of emotional alignment should
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have been probed before, during and after the experimental session to assess if overall
mood changes during the course of the study. Further evaluation of mood may reveal
interesting relations between emotional and pragmatic contagion. This may serve as a
future bridge between the study of language and emotion, as Nygaard and Queen (2008)
have stated, emotional cues such as acoustic variation influence the processing of
linguistic information.
The evidence presented in this paper advocates that in discourse, individuals
might align pragmatically to promote interaction. There is a substantial volume of
research on pragmatics, from various types of non-literal language to contexts of its usage
(e.g., Attardo, 2001; Bryant & Foxtree; 2002; Dress et al., 2008; Eisterholdet al., 2006;
Gibbs, 2000, 2006; Hancock, 2004; Kreuz, 2000; Kreuz & Glucksburg, 1989; Roberts &
Kreuz, 1994; Rockwell, 2000; Wilson & Sperber, 1992). To our knowledge, the results
we present here offer a novel piece of evidence that interlocutors, in real time, may be
aligning actively at a very high level of linguistic organization. Cues to pragmatic intent
are likely embedded within the linguistic aspects of conversation (e.g., lexical alignment),
but may also include mood-related cues. Researchers should consider the interaction
among other such variables (e.g., linguistic, pragmatic, and behavioral cues together)
occurring between interlocutors. For example, the perlocutionary nature of the statements
evokes emotional cues that may help explain pragmatics-processing mechanisms of
dialogue (e.g., humor, innuendo, or arguments). As the current results show, dialogue
may be partly underlain by an alignment process not only at the phonological, syntactic
and semantic levels, but also at the level of pragmatic exchange. Future work on
dialogue’s pragmatics, integrating such levels as linguistic (e.g., words), paralinguistic
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(e.g., prosody), and emotional behavior (e.g., laughing or grimacing) will extend our
understanding of the ecology of higher-level, real-world interactions.
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Don’t Rush the Navigator: Disambiguation Strategies Require Cognitive Flexibility
Chapter 3: Adaptation
Abstract
We report a series of studies exploring whether perceived communication breakdown
influences speakers to change their strategies in order to disambiguate. Experiment 1
implemented a visual mistake during an ambiguous two-referent instruction task with a
pseudo-confederate (similar to Haywood, Pickering, & Branigan, 2005). There was a
significant effect of the visual mistake for participants who believed they were speaking
with a real person. Also, as participants progressed through the experiment, their
disambiguation statements, relative to the unambiguous statements decreased in overall
duration. This suggests that a strategy may have been enlisted that became increasingly
automatic as time progressed. Experiment 2 assessed the effect of a visual mistake with
an imposed time pressure during the pseudo-interaction. The results suggest that during
increased time pressure or induced cognitive load, interlocutors fail to disambiguate.
Experiment 3 evaluated the effect of varying time pressure (early vs. late time pressure)
on disambiguation strategies during the pseudo-interaction. The results from this study
suggest, that when participants are allowed to formulate a disambiguation strategy (late
time pressure), their strategy will persist when they are eventually pressured for time (late
time pressure). The results also suggested that when pressured early on during an
interaction, interlocutors have difficulty disambiguating their statements, but as soon as
the time pressure is removed, they quickly disambiguate. The results from Experiment 3
replicated Experiment 2’s results, suggesting that cognitive load will have an effect on
disambiguation strategies, but only initially. We frame these results in terms of an
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adaptive, strategic account of audience design that may integrate two prominent recent
theories of how participants face interactive tasks of this kind.
Keywords: Disambiguation, Language, Communication, Cognitive load
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Don’t rush the navigator: Audience Design in Language Production is Hard to Establish,
but Easier to Maintain
Introduction
A large number of studies have attempted to get speakers to produce
unambiguous utterances for listeners, but only with mixed success (e.g., Ferreira & Dell,
2000; Haywood et al., 2005; Kraljic & Brennan, 2005; Pickering & Garrod, 2004;
Snedeker & Trueswell, 2003). However, most designs have not involved a context in
which disambiguation matters, because ambiguous utterances are unlikely to cause
breakdown in communication in these designs. In the current work, we seek to induce
participants to use an instruction-giving strategy that clarifies a visual ambiguity, thus
revealing audience design in a well-known psycholinguistic task (i.e., Haywood et al.,
2005). In the past, this task has offered relatively mixed, or weak, hints of audience
design. Here we show that disambiguation can happen as a wholesale strategy, but that it
requires cognitive flexibility to succeed. When participants are able to integrate the
communication breakdown, they make use of it successfully. In what follows, we first
review some background on audience design and ease of production during potentially
ambiguous interaction. We then detail three studies that sought to establish a real
consequence of ambiguous instructions, and observed whether participants
disambiguated. Results speak directly to theories of mechanisms of language production
and audience design: Not only is the production system willing to disambiguate, but it
will do so near ceiling if it integrates information about potential dangers of ambiguity.
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Background
When ambiguity exists, it is important to evaluate the ways in which interlocutors
recover during instances of communication breakdown and ways in which they may
formulate their statements to prevent further miscommunication, especially when they are
constrained cognitively (e.g., presence of competing visual images; Arnold & Griffin,
2007; placed under time pressure, Roßnagel, 2000; threats to referential success,
Wardlow Lane & Ferreira, 2008). Increased cognitive load may be due to ambiguity that
naturally occurs during interaction. Intuitively, it seems natural that interlocutors could
effortlessly avoid ambiguous utterances if potential miscommunication is easily
recognized and cognition affords it. Yet difficulties recognizing contextual ambiguity
often arise because individuals are cognitively burdened with contextual and
environmental complexity (e.g., foreground and background information, with an
influence from visual, auditory, and motor events; Arnold & Griffin, 2007; Broadbent,
1958; Chun, 2000; Liberman & Whalen, 2003; and Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003),
and indeed, Kraljic and Brennan (2005) found that interlocutors in these contexts are
often not aware of the ambiguity at all.
In the face of information overload, due to a large quantity or variety of
information present during communication, individuals may unintentionally ignore
contextual ambiguity or initially deem the perceived ambiguity as trivial information.
Verbal and nonverbal cues presented to an interlocutor during a communicative
interaction require correctly decoded context and meaning behind an intended message. If
a message is not disambiguated in the presence of contextual ambiguity, communication
breakdown may arise. Therefore, in some contexts, it is necessary for interlocutors to
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recognize and understand the need to disambiguate their statements when ambiguity is
present.
Horton and Keysar (1996) also address issues that deal with cognitive costs
related to maintaining conversation. Others have suggested that common ground is
continually updated throughout a conversation (Clark & Carlson, 1982; Clark &
Marshall, 1981; Clark & Murphy, 1982; Horton & Gerrig, 2005). However, Horton and
Keysar argue that it may be too costly for individuals to continually maintain, retrieve,
and update detailed information that is considered to be part of common ground.
However, if common ground becomes problematic, then regardless of the shared
knowledge, the speaker will rely on immediate context. Common ground may be
unnecessary for the construction of some utterances, and individuals may alternatively
use accessible (and potentially unshared) information initially to create a plan of action.
This plan of action could provide salient cues that assist in comprehension during
conversation through common ground, by producing violations that help interlocutors
realize the significance of a contextual ambiguity.
Speakers indeed seem to have the ability to interpret intended messages with
relatively little difficulty, regardless of the magnitude of ambiguous information that is
contextually present (Garrod & Pickering, 2004; Pickering & Garrod, 2004).
Communication partners, in turn, must formulate their language towards their audience.
If speakers realize there is a source of ambiguity, they should then formulate language
towards their listener to prevent miscommunication. However, there is some likelihood
that communication breakdown might occur if the speaker fails to recognize or
understand the significance of the contextual ambiguity (e.g., leaving out a seemingly
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useless bit of information because its utility is not recognized; Coupland, Giles, &
Wiemann, 1991; Gass & Varonis, 1991; Guhe & Bard, 2008; and Milroy, 1984).
Individuals often leave out a single word that could help clarify the intended meaning
behind a statement (e.g., using “that” as a complementizer, Ferreira, 2003; Ferreira &
Dell, 2000; or “that” to group two objects as one, Haywood et al., 2005). Some
researchers have suggested that the omission of these words, and other diverse issues in
word choice, syntax and prosody, are influenced by ease of production (Bard et al., 2007;
Bock, 1986; Branigan et al., 2000; Ferreira & Bock, 2006).
Omitting important disambiguating words, because it is easier, has often been
described as “egocentric” behavior. Some researchers maintain that this type of
behavioral response often occurs because it initially reduces cognitive load at the onset of
the conversation, especially when mutual knowledge has not been fully established (Bard
et al., 2007; Ferreira & Dell, 2000; Horton & Keysar, 1996; Kraljic & Brennan, 2005;
Schober, 1993). Since interlocutors are faced with a substantial amount of external
information, they may be more likely to lessen their own cognitive load in the future by
reducing the amount of information they provide to their listener (Roßnagel, 2000).
Individuals may leave out important words because it is easier to simply ignore
potentially relevant information until they are aware of the impact their behavior has on
what their communicative partners knows (Horton & Keysar, 1996; Lee, 2001).
However, taking an egocentric perspective may eventually become quite cumbersome if
the speaker must continually adjust his/her own previous statements when the message is
unclear (e.g., when the speaker would be required to repeat or reformulate information
until his/her intended meaning is repaired; Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark & Wilkes-
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Gibbs, 2003; Levelt, 1989; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992). In order to avoid confusion,
speakers must discover how ambiguous or unclear language may impact comprehension.
When the importance of the ambiguity is realized, and behavior is adjusted accordingly,
communication breakdown will be less likely (as hypothesized in Kraljic & Brennan,
2005 and Shintel & Keysar, 2009).
If egocentric behavior is enlisted only initially, the ease of production may lead
interlocutors to find the most appropriate method of communicating that best utilizes
their partner’s knowledge or more quickly establishes common ground. Therefore, it
should be considered that a behavior that normally looks egocentric might not be
egocentric at all. Accordingly, if a speaker excludes disambiguating information initially
(i.e., to reduce cognitive load), the speaker may better assess whether or not the listener is
also aware of the ambiguity in the scenario, without having to ask directly. Responding
this way allows the speaker to take the listener’s perspective into account more quickly.
As a consequence, if the speaker refers ambiguously to a contextual situation, and the
listener misunderstands, the speaker will then adjust his/her behavior towards the listener
to better clarify and reduce communication breakdown in the future. Interlocutors then
have better access to their partners’ knowledge, thus establishing common ground -- in
the sense of mutual recognition of obstacles to communication -- without overtaxing their
cognitive system.
Alternatively, there have been suggestions that audience design should occur
more robustly when the ambiguity matters more to participants. For example, Shintel and
Keysar (2009) note “it is also possible that once miscommunication becomes evident,
individuals will be more likely to consider their interlocutor’s informational needs” (p.
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270). Haywood et al. (2005) remark that “when there are no obvious consequences of
being ambiguous,” (p. 366) there may be less inclination to disambiguate anyway. As
mentioned, under standard experimental circumstances, it seems that participants have
trouble even processing the presence of ambiguity (Kraljic & Brennan, 2005).
The purpose of the current study is to investigate production strategies when the
context involves ambiguity and possible communication breakdown, and thus
disambiguation may matter for the joint task to succeed. It will also address the situations
in which disambiguation may arise with added cognitive load. This will offer insight into
the nature of the cognitive processes required for integrating this communication
breakdown. Below, we present three experiments that use the design of Haywood et al.
(2005) to investigate disambiguation strategies. These experiments employ contexts
facilitating the integration of the communication breakdown, thus encouraging
disambiguation by speakers.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
There were 16 University of Memphis undergraduate students recruited from the
university’s Psychology Participant Pool (12 females, mean age: 19.64 years). Each
participant was a native speaker of American English with no diagnosed hearing or
speech impairments and normal to corrected vision.
Materials
The experiment took place in a private laboratory room. Participants were seated
at a comfortable viewing distance from a 20-inch iMac computer screen. A
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headset/microphone was used to present and record acoustic data. MATLAB
PsychToolbox-3 (Brainard, 1997), draggable.m programs (Bouffard, 2003) controlled
stimulus presentation and recorded participant responses during the experimental session.
Stimuli
Stimulus creation included 2 video types, 48 pre-recorded spoken instructions and
twelve 5 x 5 grids of static images. Each experimental trial included presentations of 3
types of media (static images, auditory, and video; see below for more descriptive
explanations of each).
Static Images. The static images used during the experimental session included
25 Container (C; e.g., box), Object (O; e.g., banana), Container + Object (C+O; e.g., an
image of the banana in the box) pseudo-randomly placed images and geometric shapes in
a 5 x 5 grid. Each grid included a total of 8 geometric shapes (i.e., circle, octagon, cross,
triangle, rectangle, half moon, diamond and heart; see Figure 4 for examples of the
geometric shapes). There were at least 6 C and O images (1 extra C or O image was
randomly selected for each round), and 4 C+O images (8 geometric shapes, 4 C+O, 6 C,
6 O, and 1 randomly selected C or O = 25 images; see Figure 4 for an example of the
image display). Within the 5 x 5 grids, 4 C and 4 O images were items that made up the
C+O image (e.g., C = box; O = banana; and C+O = banana in a box; see Figure 4) to
create perceived ambiguity in the visual array. During each instruction round, different
images were placed in the grids to prevent repetitive instruction phrases (e.g., the
instruction “Put the banana in the box on the circle” was never repeated on subsequent
instruction trials/rounds).
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Figure 4. Represents a) the screen participants viewed when listening to an instruction
from the pseudo-confederate, b) the screen participants viewed while giving instructions
to the pseudo-confederate.

Auditory. The pseudo-confederate, a Caucasian female talker was asked to
produce/record a total of 48 auditory instructions for the experimental task. These
instructions included two filler and two critical trials [Filler: 1 C, 1 O, and Critical Trials:
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2 C+O]. A C filler statement referenced a container image to be moved onto a geometric
shape (e.g., “Put the box on the triangle”). An O filler statement referenced an image that
was not a container, to be moved onto a geometric shape (e.g., “Put the banana on the
rectangle”). A critical trial C+O statement referenced an image that contained both a
container and an object to be moved onto a geometric shape (e.g., an image of a banana
in a box). The C+O statements were always ambiguous to prevent the pseudoconfederate from priming the participant with a way to disambiguate (see Haywood, et
al., 2005). Each of these statements was recorded via Matlab and Matlab PsychToolbox-3
programs.
The pseudo-confederate was provided with a text version of the scripted
instructions. She was also instructed to speak her statements based on a visual display
that corresponded with the text instruction. For example, she was presented with the 5 x 5
grid of images, and within this grid an image with a yellow background (image to be
moved), and a geometric shape with a yellow highlight (location of object placement; see
Figure 4b) around it were presented. These yellow background/highlighted images were
used to guide her instruction production. The purpose of recording sound files with a text
script and visual display was to obtain more natural productions from the pseudoconfederate.
Each of the pseudo-confederate instructions was sampled at a 44.1kHz, 16-bit
sampling rate. Consistent with many speech production/perception studies, the sound
stimuli were equated for RMS amplitude to control for subjective perceived loudness.
This allowed the researchers to set the listening volume to a comfortable listening level.
Additionally, presenting auditory stimuli with unequal loudness could provide unwanted
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perceptual cuing to the deception in the task. Varying loudness could indicate the
statements were pre-recorded or perceived as coming from a different source if the
overall amplitude was not the same.
Video. The videos used were correct and incorrect pseudo-confederate responses
to the participant’s instruction. A correct video response showed the correct image
moved to the instructed location on the grid (i.e., to represent no miscommunication). An
incorrect response included the selection of C and O images that corresponded to an
instruction to move a C+O image, but the correct C+O image was never selected and/or
moved during ambiguous trials (i.e., to indicate complete communication
breakdown/miscommunication). There were 12 incorrect videos randomly distributed
throughout one of the between-subjects experimental conditions, in an attempt to increase
the likelihood that participants would recognize mistakes and communication breakdown
throughout the entirety of the experimental session. This was done to indicate the
possibility that communication breakdown could happen at any point during an
interaction.
Each video was recorded using iShow-U, a Mac program that allows dynamic
screen capture. Each video included the movement of images that corresponded with predetermined participant instructions within the 5 x 5 grid of images. Each of the video
types were initially recorded as .mov files, but were later uncompressed and shrunk to
352 x 240 pixel .avi files. This was done because the aviread function in Matlab requires
all avi files to be in uncompressed format. Also, shrinking was performed to remedy
memory problems that the Matlab program had with running the video files. Since the
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videos were uncompressed, video quality was slightly compromised, but not seriously
(the videos were less crisp, but still as perceptible as the original movie files).
Procedure
The experiment consisted of 12 rounds of trials with 8 spoken instructions (4
participant and 4 pseudo-confederate) per round. Participant instructions, in any given
round, included 2 filler instructions (C and O) and 2 critical instructions (C+O). During
the course of the experiment, participants produced a total 24 critical instructions that
required disambiguation (2 per round). Within a round, the 4 types of instructions (C, O,
2 C+O) were pseudo-randomly shuffled to prevent order effects. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of two between-subjects conditions. Condition one, the correct
condition, included no incorrect pseudo-confederate responses. Condition two, the
mistake condition, included 12 pseudo-random incorrect video and 36 correct video
presentations.
At the start of the experiment, the participant was seated next to a Caucasian
female confederate while completing the informed consent, but separated during the
experimental sessions. A Caucasian female confederate was chosen because the pseudoconfederate was a Caucasian female. This is an important distinction to make, because
much of talker variability is related to the perception of race and gender (Ryalls et al.,
1997; Walton & Orlikoff, 1994), and because the student population at the University of
Memphis is quite diverse, making such cues readily recognizable. Therefore, it was
important to have the live confederate match the race and gender of the pseudoconfederate to promote the believability of having a real interaction.
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During participant instruction, it was explained that s/he was separated from
his/her partner (Confederate) as a way to obtain uncontaminated auditory recordings,
because when having a conversation, people often speak over each other. The participant
was then instructed that s/he would receive and give instructions about moving objects
around a screen. The participant was also told that s/he would be viewing the same 5 x 5
grid as his/her partner. The participant was told that his/her partner would begin the
experiment because she had been set up on the experiment first. Specific instruction to
the participant went as follows:
“To begin the experiment, please press the ‘Get Instruction’ button (see Figure
4a). By doing this, you will send an auditory prompt in the form of a beep to your partner
to let her know that you are now ready to begin the experiment. She will then tell you to
move some object around the screen. When she is finished giving the instruction, please
select the image she asked you to move with the mouse and drag and drop it to the
location she specifies. When you are finished moving your object please click the ‘Next’
button. This will transition you into your instruction screen. When you see an image that
has a yellow background (C, O, or C+O) and an image with a yellow highlight
(geometric shape; see Figure 4b), instruct your partner to move the image with the yellow
background onto the image with the yellow highlight. When you are finished providing
your instruction, please press the ‘Done Instructing’ button. Wait a few seconds for your
partner to respond and you will see her response to your instruction pop up on the screen
in front of you. You will continue this way until you seen an empty 5 x 5 grid.”
Participants were then asked to explain the instructions back to the researcher in
their own words. Once the researcher felt the participant understood the task, s/he was
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presented with a 52sec video of how to maneuver through the task. This was done to
solidify the participants’ understanding of the task. The researcher then asked the
participant to make a mental note of any mistakes their partner made (in hopes of
ensuring the mistakes were attended to during the experimental session), because they
would be asked about those mistakes at the end of the experiment. This was rationalized
to the participant by explaining that if the researcher understood the types of mistakes
that were made, the design of the experiment could later be improved.
Results
At the end of the experiment, the participant and confederate were rejoined for
debriefing. Just before debriefing, when asked how many mistakes were made by the
partner (pseudo-confederate), participants reported: Correct Condition = 0/0 and Mistake
Condition = 3.43/12 (! = 2.49). Accuracy in remembering the number of mistakes was
relatively unimportant; this measure was simply to ensure the participants recognized the
mistakes. When asked, participants were able to accurately describe the type of mistakes
they saw. Participants were also asked, “Would you be surprised if I told you that you
were not actually speaking with the person sitting next to you?” The resulting percentage
of deceived participants was 67%. Since some participants were not deceived by the
experimental design, the statistical analysis for this experiment will include Deception as
a factor.
A 2 (Condition: correct & mistakes) x 2 (Deception: deceived & not deceived) x 3
(Block: rounds 1-4, 5-8, & 9-12) mixed repeated fixed effects model with a first-order
auto-regressive (AR1) variance-covariance structure, was used to evaluate the proportion
of disambiguated statements during critical trials in a given round. If the participant
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verbally grouped the two images as one during a critical instruction trial, it was marked
as a disambiguated response. For example, if the participant said, “Put the banana that’s
in the box on the circle,” or “Put the box with the banana in it, on the circle,” then their
instruction would have been coded as disambiguated. However, if the participant failed to
group the objects as one (“Put the banana in the box on the circle”), the statement would
have been coded as ambiguous. The majority of participants disambiguated responses
were in the above formats; only rarely did the participants come up with different
strategies to group the images (e.g., “Put the banana in the box, that picture, on the
circle”).
The initial analysis of the variance-covariance structure, the AR1 variancecovariance structure was used because it seemed to have the best fit for the data. The
results from this model suggests there was a significant main effect of Deception [F(1,
14.139) = 10.593, p < .01); see Figure 5a] and block [F(2, 24.933) = 5.087, p < .05); see
Figure 5b]. The model also revealed a significant Condition x Deception interaction [F(1,
14.139) = 12.682, p < .005); see Figure 5c]. The main effect of Deception revealed that
deceived individuals disambiguated their statements 36.9% more than participants who
were not deceived (see Figure 5a).
!
!
!
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Figure 5. Means and standard errors for the proportion of disambiguation during

!

Experiment 1: a) the main effect of Deception, b) the main effect of Block and c) the
Condition x Deception Interaction.

!
Post-hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons for the main effect of Block
revealed that there were significantly fewer instances of disambiguation in Block 1,
relative to Block 2 (19.7%, p < .05) and block 2 was marginally different than Block 3
(18.5%, p = .08; see Figure 5b for means and standard errors).
Post-hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons for the Condition x
Deception interaction revealed that deceived participants who viewed the pseudoconfederate mistakes disambiguated 52.2% more than participants who did not view
mistakes (p < .001). However, there were no significant differences between the
participants who were not deceived and the condition they were in (p = .206).
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Reaction Time. Experiment 1 allowed participants to freely create their own
strategies of disambiguating. Therefore, we analyzed the time course of the language
production in the task to determine if the awareness of communication breakdown helped
or hindered ease of production when participants were allowed to freely strategize. The
participant recordings provided an onset-to-speaking reaction time. A 2 (Deception:
deception & no deception) x 2 (Condition: correct & mistake) x 2 (Statement Type: filler
& critical) x 3 (Block) mixed fixed effects model with deception, condition, and subjects
held as random factors, with a scaled identity (ID) variance covariance structure was used
to evaluate the amount of time it took participants’ to vocally respond with their
instruction. The type III test of fixed effects revealed that there were no significant main
effects or interactions for initial reaction time (initiation of vocal response) to instruction
production. This suggests that participants did not differentially process the type of
instruction to be produced. On average, it took participants about 2.5 seconds overall to
begin speaking their instructions, regardless of the instruction they were providing.
Total Duration. In order to better assess the time course of production, we also
analyzed participants’ total speaking time in the trials. A 2 (Deception: deception & no
deception) x 2 (Condition: correct & mistake) x 2 (Statement Type: disambiguation
required & no disambiguation required) x 3 (Block) mixed fixed effects model with
deception, condition, and subjects held as random factors, with a scaled identity (ID)
variance covariance structure was used to evaluate the total duration of participant’s
instruction giving trials. The type III test of fixed effects revealed a significant main
effect of Statement Type [F(1, 685)=6.303, p < .05], main effect of Block [F(2,
685)=42.222, p<.001], Deception x Condition interaction [F(1, 11)=15.355, p < .005],
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and Condition x Statement Type interaction [F(1, 685)=5.672, p < .05]. The main effect
of Statement Type revealed that when a statement needed to be disambiguated, the
duration of production time was significantly less than when the statement did not require
disambiguation (mean difference = 609msec, p < .05; see Figure 6a for means and
standard errors). Also, the main effect of Block suggests duration of production
significantly decreases from Block 1 relative to Blocks 2 and 3 (both p < .001; see Figure
6b for means and standard errors for Block).
Post hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons for the Deception x
Condition interaction revealed that statements produced in the Correct condition were
significantly shorter than statements produced in the Mistake condition when participants
were deceived (p < .005). Also, the participants who were not deceived produced
significantly shorter statements when they saw a visual mistake as opposed to participants
that did not see a mistake (p < .05; see Figure 6c for means and standard errors for the
Deception x Condition interaction).
Post hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons for Condition x Statement
Type interaction revealed that statements that required disambiguation were produced
significantly faster than statements that did not require disambiguation for the mistake
condition (p < .001; see Figure 6d means and standard errors for the Condition x
Statement interaction).
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Figure 6. Reaction time (sec) means and standard errors for Experiment 1: a) main effect
of Statement Type (Filler: C, O, and Critical Ambiguous: C+O), b) main effect of Block,
c) Deception x Condition interaction and d) Statement x Condition interaction.

Discussion
Upon initial evaluation, only 67% of the participants were deceived. However,
when participants were asked why they felt the deception failed, many of the participants
said that they were aware of the deception that usually occurs during psychological
experiments. Many of these participants who were not deceived reported being upper
division psychology students or had experience participating in other psychology
experiments. This resulted in differential responding between deceived and not deceived
participants in Experiment 1. This may have been due to the fact that some participants
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were more invested (deceived participants) in helping their conversation partner because
they may have felt they were truly influencing another person’s behavior. The individuals
who were not deceived may have felt it was unnecessary to disambiguate, because there
was nothing to lose or gain by instructing ambiguously. This supports the idea that the
disambiguation by deceived participants was generally for the benefit of the assumed
other. When the undeceived participants perceived no benefit in disambiguating, they
expended less effort and disregarded the constraints of the task.
Overall, all of the participants disambiguated their statements more as their
interaction progressed. This suggests that participants may begin instructing their partners
in an egocentric manner because they are initially unsure about the task at hand, but as
time progressed they were able to take the other person’s perspective into account. Also,
the Deception x Condition interaction suggests that when the turn-taking scenario seemed
relatively natural, providing a nonverbal behavioral cue to miscommunication was highly
effective.
As the experiment progressed, participants produced significantly more
disambiguated instructions during ambiguous trials, but the time it took to process the
visual array and vocally respond did not change over time. However, the amount of time
it took to produce an entire instruction for an ambiguous trial was significantly less than
for the filler instructions. This might suggest that at the time of and during production,
the enlistment of a disambiguating strategy may have helped reduce the cognitive load
that naturally existed in the task environment, thus decreasing production time. This
result was somewhat surprising and interesting because more words were produced
during the critical trials than the filler trials. Therefore the faster production time for the
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critical trials suggests that the disambiguating strategy chosen may have become
increasingly automatic as the task progressed. This notion is supported by the main effect
of Block for total production time. This effect suggests that as interlocutors interact in the
task, the production time decrease may be due to the implementation of successful
instructing strategies, which eases constraints for production. Also, the Deception x
Condition interaction revealed that participants in the mistake condition might have spent
more time formulating their instruction when they were cued to the ambiguity in the
visual scene. This might suggest that participants that were not deceived may have found
it inconsequential to spend extra time on disambiguating when they realized they were
not speaking with a real person, which may have intrinsically reduced the cognitive load
overall. Finally, the Condition x Statement interaction further supports the notion that
participants in the mistake condition implement a useful and successful strategy to
quickly give instructions during the trials that were created to be ambiguous.
It should also be noted that upon evaluation of the types of syntactic structures the
deceived participants chose, they usually used the standard “that” description, but also
used other syntactic strategies to group the “Container + Object” images as one item
(e.g., Put the banana in the box, that image, on the circle; Put the box with the banana in
it on the circle). This supports the view that once speakers become aware of the
ambiguity’s importance, they are better able to implement and maintain a syntactic
strategy for future statements. Therefore, if participants understand that they are
communicating ambiguously and there are direct perceived consequences, then they will
more quickly try to recover from their mistakes by any means available to them.
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Overall, the results from Experiment 1 suggest that a nonverbal cue to
miscommunication may be a more effective cue to use during contextually ambiguous
situations. Suggesting the predictions noted in the introduction, when ambiguities matter,
and participants have the cognitive abilities to identify them, they can formulate
consistent production strategies. The results from the production time analysis suggest
that instruction time decreased as a function of task familiarity and successful linguistic
strategy implementation. These findings directly support Horton and Keysar’s (1996)
Monitoring and Adjustment theory, in that participants may respond egocentrically
initially to assess their communication partner’s knowledge in a time saving manner.
Once the speaker “knows” what his/her listener knows, s/he is more readily able to adjust
his/her behavior accordingly. Yet, the production time finding also supports Brennan et
al. (2010) and Galati and Brennan’s (2010) one-bit model, suggesting that once the
speaker realizes the significance of the ambiguity and listener’s knowledge, they are able
to effectively implement disambiguation in a rapid and persistent way. As we argue in the
General Discussion below, these two competing theories could work together to explain
the results here. This suggests a theoretical rapprochement that we take up below. Before
revisiting this issue, we present two experiments testing whether communication
breakdown can be integrated in the midst of cognitive load, or whether cognitive
flexibility is required to accomplish this.
Experiment 2
Cues to communication breakdown have proven to be useful bits of information
that aid interlocutors in recognizing the significance of contextual ambiguity as well as
ways to avoid responding to such contexts ambiguously. However, interlocutors are often
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not afforded the luxury of having the time necessary to find/implement such
disambiguation strategies. For example, if a speaker is giving a driver directions to a new
location, while the driver is currently en route, the speaker does not have the luxury to
spend a significant amount of time trying monitor and adjust his/her behavior to prevent
miscommunication. Therefore, under time pressure, one would expect a great deal of
communication breakdown to occur, because monitoring and adjustment behaviors take
time (Horton & Keysar, 1996). Instruction of this type may greatly increase
miscommunication, especially if the speaker has never given the instructions before (e.g.,
because s/he may not be aware of the significance of the contextual ambiguity until the
ambiguity becomes more salient). Therefore, the purpose of Experiment 2 is to determine
if visual cues to communication breakdown are still salient under a time constraint.
Method
Participants
There were 17 University of Memphis undergraduate students recruited from the
university’s Psychology Participant Pool (12 females, mean age: 22.8 years). Each
participant was a native speaker of American English with no diagnosed hearing or
speech impairments and normal to corrected vision.
Materials
The materials were identical to Experiments 1.
Stimuli
Static images, auditory and video stimuli were identical to those in Experiment 1
with the exception of a visual point display (discussed below).
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Visual Point Display
This experiment included a visual point display that was integrated into the screen
participants saw during the task. Participants were required to give their responses within
7 seconds to receive a point. This time frame was chosen because average response time
for participants to make their responses in a pilot study and Experiments 1 was about
7sec. As participants transitioned through each “instruction giving” trial, they either
received (< 7sec) or lost (> 7sec) a point, depending on the speed of their instructing
performance. As they performed the task, a number display was situated at the bottom
left hand corner of the experiment screen. The number display presented the point value
in a red, Arial, 18 point font, to ensure participants noticed that their points changed, but
was not so noticeable that it would distract them from providing the instruction.
Procedure
Participants received slightly different instructions during this experiment. Before
the experiment began, both participant and confederate were given the consent form to
fill out and were provided with an extra instruction before the task began. The extra
instruction went as follows:
“Before you are both set up to run through the experiment, I want to tell you a
little about what you both will be doing today. The two of you will be playing a game,
where you give each other instructions about moving objects around a screen (I will give
you detailed instructions about this right before you start the experiment). But, you will
be in separate rooms talking to each other through a network that links your computers.
The way you both will play the game is to give each other instructions as quickly
and as accurately as you possibly can. When it is your turn to give the instruction, you
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will only have a short amount of time to do so. If you can give the instruction within this
time period you will be granted a point. However, if you are unable to do this, you will
lose a point. At the end of the experiment, if both of you have the same number of points
(or at least a few points off from each other), then you will both be rewarded with a large
candy bar of your choice. If your points are not equal, then you will be given a “funsize”
candy bar. So, if you or your partner really wants the large candy bar, then you both will
have to do whatever you can to give the correct instructions as quickly as possible.
Because remember, your behavior will influence your partner’s reward and vice versa.”
Once this instruction was completed the participant and confederate were
separated and the instructions provided were identical to those indicated in Experiment 1.
Another manipulation during this experiment occurred with the presentation of the
pseudo-confederate video. The video was moved to the middle of the participant’s
viewing screen to increase the likelihood that the participant would see a mistake when it
occurred, since the visual point display could potentially detract from their attention to
the task. It also ensures that if the time pressure diminishes disambiguation, it was not
due to this distraction, since the video was highlighted in this way.
The total number of points a participant could receive was 48 (i.e., 1 point per
instruction trial). It did not matter if his/her points matched the Confederate’s points,
because they in fact did not actually interact with another person. Therefore, all
participants were rewarded with a large candy bar regardless of their performance in the
task.
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Results
On average, participants received 36 out of 48 points. The reward was only given
to participants after they were debriefed and asked in the same way as in Experiment 1:
1) “How many mistakes did your partner make?”: (Correct Condition = 0/0; Mistake
Condition = 4.25/12; ! =2.19); 2) “Would you be surprised if I told you that you were not
actually speaking with the person sitting next to you?” The resulting percentage of
deceived participants was 100%.
A 2 (Condition: correct & mistake) x 3 (Block: beginning, middle, & end) mixed
fixed repeated measures effects model was used to assess the proportion of
disambiguation responses during critical instruction trials. The type III test of fixed
effects model revealed no significant main effects or interactions.
We wished to compare the results in this experiment to the previous experiment,
in which there was no time constraint. A 2 (Experiment: no time constraint & time
constraint) x 2 (Condition: correct & mistake) x 3 (Block: beginning, middle, & end)
mixed fixed repeated measures effects model was used to assess the proportion of
disambiguation responses during critical instruction trials. The type III test of fixed
effects revealed a significant main effect of Experiment [F(1,23) = 8.863, p < .01; see
Figure 7a], main effect of Block [F(2,46) = 8.274, p < .005; see Figure 7b], Experiment x
Condition interaction [F(1,23) = 10.925, p < .005; see Figure 7c], and a significant
Experiment x Condition x Block interaction [F(2,46) = 4.188, p < .05; see Figure 7d].
The main effect of Experiment revealed that participants disambiguated 31.5% more
during the experiment when there was no time constraint (Experiment 1).
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Figure 7. Means and standard errors of the proportion of disambiguated responses
between Experiment 1 and 2: a) main effect of Experiment, b) main effect of Block, c)
Experiment x Condition interaction and d) Experiment x Block x Condition interaction.

Post hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons for the main effect of Block
revealed there was a significantly lower proportion of disambiguation within the first
block (first 4 rounds) relative to the middle (second 4 rounds, p < .005) and end (last 4
rounds, p < .01). However, the middle and end blocks did not significantly differ, p = 1.0.
Post hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons for the Experiment x
Condition interaction revealed that there was a higher proportion of disambiguation for
the mistake condition in Experiment 1 (no time constraint, p < .005), but this was not true
for Experiment 2 (time constraint, p = .202; see Figure 7c).
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Post hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons for the Experiment x
Condition x Block interaction revealed that for the mistake condition within Experiment
1 (no time constraint) there was a higher proportion of disambiguation during the middle
(second 4 rounds; p < .01) and end (last 4 rounds, p < .05) relative to the beginning block
(first 4 rounds). Also, the pair wise comparisons revealed that for the correct condition
within Experiment 2 (time constraint) there was a higher proportion of disambiguation
during the end block (last 4 rounds, p < .05) relative to the beginning block; see Figure
7d).
Discussion
The results from Experiment 2 suggest that time pressure greatly reduces
speakers’ ability to implement disambiguation strategies during ambiguous visual
contexts. This result is evident from the null results found in the initial mixed model
analysis, and supported by the comparison of disambiguation during Experiment 1 and 2.
More specifically, it was found that interlocutors disambiguated significantly more when
they were not constrained by time (Experiment 1). This might suggest that if interlocutors
have the time, they have the ability to effectively assess and formulate different strategies
to clearly instruct their listeners. This result supports the notion that Monitoring and
Adjustment takes time (Horton & Keysar, 1996). However, when interlocutors are
constrained by time, they may revert to an “ease of production” strategy because it
prevents the cognitive system from becoming overtaxed. This finding is also consistent
with a study specifically evaluating cognitive load and perspective taking (Roßnagel,
2000). Roßnagel found that speakers who were pressured cognitively failed to adapt their
behaviors towards their listener. This author concludes that when pressured cognitively,
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monitoring and adjustment is greatly impaired. Therefore, the results of this experiment
suggest that interlocutors need time to process and produce linguistic information to
efficiently and correctly inform their conversation partners. In natural settings,
interlocutors may be able to overcome or adapt to cognitive constraints. Therefore, the
next study will evaluate varying levels of cognitive load during the instruction-giving
task.
Experiment 3
Ideal conversation partners would be those who can attend to both their own and
their partner’s perspectives simultaneously while speaking. They would carefully
accommodate their partner’s information needs despite the cognitive challenges that
accompany speaking. Sadly, it appears that such ideal partners may not exist. Though
speakers clearly accommodate under some conditions (“audience design,” Brennan et al.,
2010), several studies have revealed that interaction partners can show egocentric biases,
and often focus on their own information before they, if possible, focus on listener
relevant information (Shintel & Keysar, 2009). Some theorists emphasize the dominance
of egocentric information given its ease of access, and have argued that any audience
design is cognitively challenging as a consequence of a serial monitoring-and-adjustment
system (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Horton & Keysar, 1996). If
audience design is always affected by cognitive constraints, it should not matter which
condition participants are in – in both cases, speeded trials ought to force participants to
use more accessible, egocentric information, thus producing an ambiguous utterance.
However, if establishing audience design is challenging, then participants who initially

69

have time to formulate a strategy should make use of that strategy when subsequently
constrained for time.
Method
Participants
There were 16 University of Memphis undergraduate students recruited from the
university’s Psychology Participant Pool (14 females, mean age: 20.6 years). Each
participant was a native speaker of American English with no diagnosed hearing or
speech impairments and normal to corrected vision.
Materials
The materials were identical to Experiments 1 and 2.
Stimuli
Static images, auditory and video stimuli were identical to those in Experiments 1
and 2.
Visual Point Display. The visual point display was identical to the one described
in Experiment 2, but only for the speeded trials.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiments 1 and 2, with the exception that the
participant and confederate were told they would be playing a game where they would
receive/lose points during speeded trials (i.e., like Experiment 2) and but no points would
be available during the unhurried trials (i.e., like Experiment 1). Two between-subjects
conditions involved the point at which the cognitive constraint (speeded instructions)
occurred. The speeded"unhurried condition included a time limit for rounds 1-6
(requiring a response in < 7s), and unlimited time during rounds 7-12 (requiring a
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response in > 7s). The unhurried"speeded condition reversed these, with unlimited time
during rounds 1-6, and a time limit during rounds 7-12. Halfway through each betweensubjects condition, the interface would switch the types of trials (either speeded or
unhurried). An instruction screen was informed the participants that the following trials
would be either speeded or unhurried instructions, depending on the condition. During
debriefing, participants reported an average of 5.06 (! = 3.3) pseudo-confederate
mistakes, and 94% of participants believed they were interacting with a real person.
Results
A 2 condition (speeded"unhurried or unhurried"speeded) x 2 block (speeded
or unhurried) mixed fixed-effects, repeated measures model was used to evaluate the
proportion of disambiguation during the 24 target ambiguous trials. The analysis revealed
the proportion of disambiguation was significantly lower during speeded than unhurried
trials [Condition: F(1, 14.306) = 15.458, p < .001; see Figure 8a], suggesting cognitive
load interfered with disambiguation. Also, a significant condition x block interaction
[F(1, 14.306) = 5.885, p < .05; Fig. 8b] was found.
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Figure 8. Means and standard errors of the proportion of disambiguated responses for a)
main effect of Condition [Phase 1 (Early): speeded ! unhurried; Phase 2 (Late):
unhurried ! speeded] and b) Condition x Block interaction.

Adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons for the condition x block interaction
revealed that participants in the speeded"unhurried condition disambiguated
significantly more when unhurried (p < .005). During speeded trials in the
speeded"unhurried condition, participants disambiguated significantly less relative to
participants in the unhurried"speeded condition (p < .01). This suggests that participants
may quickly recover from communication breakdown if the time constraint is removed

72

(Fig. 3.5b). A key feature of these results, however, is that if participants initially have
time, such as in the unhurried"speeded condition, they may be able to develop a
strategy that persists even when the cognitive system is taxed during speeded trials.
Discussion
Results from Experiment 3 suggest that it is not audience design that is
challenging; rather the establishment of it is taxing. Once speakers have learned how to
accommodate a listener, they will do so almost completely, even if they are challenged
cognitively. Thus, speakers can successfully use communication breakdown as a cue that
a task partner needs more information. The results suggest that audience design is not
limited by fixed cognitive constraints, but may be initially difficult because it represents a
shift in strategy that requires cognitive flexibility.
More specifically, these results show that when mistakes occur, and sufficient
time is permitted for adaptation, speakers thoroughly engage in audience design.
Additionally, in the unhurried"speeded condition, speakers were still able to engage in
audience design when pressured for time. This “non-egocentric” production strategy has
become a new “egocentric” default – in the sense that the speaker can use disambiguating
sentences readily even when rushed. These findings show that audience design strategies
are indeed difficult to establish (i.e., speeded"unhurried condition), but not necessarily
difficult to sustain once they are in place. Trial-by-trial language production strategies are
shaped by what listener-specific information a speaker’s cognitive system is capable of
integrating and adjusting for (Horton & Gerrig, 2005). Dual-process theory predicts that
any audience design process is cognitively challenging, and should break down when the
cognitive system is taxed (Epley et al., 2004). On the contrary, these results suggest that
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audience design does not have to be difficult once an effective strategy has been
established.
General Discussion
The results of all three experiments offer some general observations about
audience design and its underlying mechanisms. Communication partners are able to
disambiguate when they 1) are aware of the contextual ambiguity, 2) are invested in an
interaction, 3) understand that speaking ambiguously has negative consequences on
communication (e.g., miscommunication), and 4) have the time to formulate a
disambiguating strategy. When an interlocutor successfully recognizes ambiguity and its
communicative consequences through common ground with their partner, absent
excessive cognitive load, this leads to the avoidance of ambiguity. These conditions may
seem cognitively heavy, but they may need to be when speakers are seeking a strategy for
a complicated and extended joint task. And as we discuss further below, once the strategy
has taken shape, cognitive load may no longer be such a problem.
When communication breakdown and ambiguity become apparent to the
participant, s/he may be more readily able to integrate such breakdowns to prevent further
miscommunication. For example, interlocutors may actively use descriptive language
more readily when there is an object to be contrasted to reduce ambiguity about
competitor objects in a visual scene (Brown-Schmidt, Campana, & Tanenhaus, 2005;
Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, 2008). Indeed language comprehension studies suggest
referential ambiguity affects eye movements rapidly in real-time (Tanenhaus, SpiveyKnowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1996). Therefore, the speaker must be aware of the
consequences of the referential ambiguity to put forth a disambiguating strategy. It may
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be more physical aspects of production and not a language production-strategy, such as
patterns and frequency of gesture (e.g., vocal or motor) that become more easily
adaptable to speakers on the fly. In these experiments, the participants are highly aware
of the referential ambiguity and the knowledge state of the listener as an aspect of the
task (Kuhlen & Brennan, 2010). Therefore, once these “bits” of information become
more readily accessible to the speaker, the speaker may integrate them more readily and
for the sake of the listener.
This seems to be exemplified in Experiment 1, when deceived participants in the
mistake condition disambiguate significantly more than participants who received no
breakdown cues. A happenstance visual mistake or some other type of behavioral cue
(e.g., asking clarifying questions; Pickering & Garrod, 2004) should be an alternative and
effective piece of information interlocutors have available for use during natural
conversation scenarios. Once an effective strategy has been found, it may be
implemented and will persist as long as communication breakdown is remedied. This was
supported by Experiment 1, in which the non-linguistic disambiguating cue did in fact
help the participants recognize the ambiguity and a successful strategy was shown to
reduce production time. Becoming aware of the need to reformulate their productions
allowed them to revise their statements to accommodate their listener more readily. This
type of cue to communication breakdown allowed participants to respond effectively and
creatively when resolving the confusion. However, this type of behavior will fail if
interlocutors do not have the time to implement such strategic behaviors (Experiments 2
& 3).
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At the start of our tasks, the participants’ productions suggest they are behaving
egocentrically. Yet, at a higher level of explanation -- beyond whether it is “ego-” or
“other-” centric -- this automatic strategy may represent a cheap means of “sampling” the
interactive context for future disambiguation needs. In other words, a heuristic of
knowledge accessibility (i.e., the self’s frame of reference) may be present because it is a
temporally and cognitively affordable way of getting information about one’s interaction
partner. The very fact that interactive partners may not need to explicitly formulate this
strategy motivates its potential status as an ingrained heuristic, unless some other pieces
of information are available (and recognized) that prevent its initial application (e.g., we
discuss “one-bit” notions below). Therefore, egocentric behavior at the outset could be a
time-saving heuristic, in which the speaker waits until something “wrong” happens, and
if so, seeks ways to forestall future breakdowns (Bard et al., 2007).
In the studies here, we experimentally produced the sense that initial productions
may be leading to breakdown. The integration of ambiguity recognition and the
consequences of communication breakdown do require cognitive flexibility, but once the
consequences are recognized, interlocutors are able to implement a persistent and
efficient disambiguating strategy, as seen in Experiment 3. When their “egocentrism” is
overcome, and participants engage in listener adaptation, this audience design becomes
the new strategic default, and monitoring may be carried out to determine whether this
new strategy needs to be changed. This suggests that once a disambiguating strategy is
used by the speaker, then cognitive load should no longer be an issue -- it is identifying
and integrating for the sake of audience design that is challenging, but the design itself
may be less cognitively challenging once it is established in behavior. Also, it may not be
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that interlocutors default to an “ego-centric” response, they may be aware of the
ambiguity and know what they want to say, but production constraints prevent them from
disambiguating (Griffin, 2004).
As noted above, it may seem that the results from initial productions and time
pressure support Horton and Keysar’s (1996) Monitoring and Adjustment theory, in that
participants respond egocentrically initially and only wait for any potential problems with
their communication partner’s knowledge. Yet we would argue that other aspects of our
findings support Brennan et al. (2010) and Galati and Brennan’s (2010) one-bit model. It
suggests that once speakers realize the significance of the ambiguity and listener’s
knowledge, they are able to effectively implement a disambiguation strategy in a rapid
and persistent way. This may mean that a more general theoretical framework is needed
that integrates Horton and Keysar’s (1996) Monitoring and Adjustment Model and
Brennan et al.’s (2010) “one-bit” model, both reflections of theoretical tendencies that
account for language production in ways that place different emphasis on what counts as
the “default” process during interaction. The two competing frameworks are in fact not
independent of each other, and they could work together to explain our results. We
consider this possibility briefly here. First, in order for a persistent and effective
disambiguating strategy to work, the important social information (or “bit”) must be
activated via some form of recognition process. This activation may never be possible if
an interlocutor is unable to monitor communication breakdown and adjust his/her own
behavior to prevent further miscommunication. Once they do, however, speakers may
eagerly take in the information, and completely “reorganize” their speaking behavior in
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the task for the sake of the listener. The audience-design adjustment becomes the new
default from which new monitoring is carried out.
We thus advocate an adaptive account that does not anchor itself to concepts of
“default” as a fixed aspect of production processes during interaction. It is not a matter of
simply being either “egocentric” vs. “other-centric” in these designs, as two fixed
processes, fixed in their relationship in time, and fixed throughout a task. A more
integrative account sees the speaker’s behavior in a situation as being shaped by task
constraints. The initial moments of using “accessible” knowledge is a mere function of
what the speaker can only know in the initial moments of a task. So-called “egocentric”
behavior is cheap, and may sample the space of interaction to test whether such cheap,
accessible information sources are sufficient. But when there is a breakdown, and when
the speaker recognizes a breakdown, then some cognitive investment can help – not
simply by “monitoring” on a trial-by-trial basis, but by wholesale adaptive reorganization
of his/her behavior. This “non-egocentric” behavior then becomes the new “egocentric”
default – in the sense that a new array of information may be more readily accessed in a
highly consistent way during the interaction. This theoretical rapprochement may be
capable of explaining a broad array of findings in the literature, by focusing on how an
interaction partner’s specific cognitive processes are shaped by task constraints (e.g.,
memory, Horton & Gerrig, 2005, or turn-taking, Haywood et al., 2005), and events in the
task (discovering the important bits described in Brennan et al., 2010), rather than
seeking stage-based models that assume fixed cognitive strategies during language
production.
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“Your tone says it all”: Language production, perception and action.
Chapter 4: Interpretation
Abstract
Language, prosody and social cues to affective speech are essential for successful
interpretation of intent (Attardo et al., 2005). Nygaard and Lunders (2002) have shown
that affective prosody impacts the resolution of lexical ambiguity during spoken
language, yet social cues are understudied. The current studies evaluate the impact of
affective prosody and social factors (e.g., gender and perceived identity through dialect)
associated with the production, perception and action upon intent behind spoken
language. The results from the production study suggest that affect production may
involve a substantial amount of talker variability. Though there was a considerable
amount of talker variability in the productions, listeners seemed to easily and accurately
categorize intent, thus, relying heavily on talker related cues. Therefore, it would seem
that talker variability, in the form of prosodic variation and social cues, influence a
listener’s interpretation during online processing of intent.
Keywords: Affect, Language, Prosody, Social cues
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“Your tone says it all”: Language production, perception and action.
Social interactions are often driven by behaviors related to the expression of
affect. The tendency to respond affectively is important to decrease social distance,
coordinate social activities, provide cues to others about how to respond in a socially
appropriate manner, and may help promote the interpretation of other’s behaviors that
help regulate interpersonal interactions (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Fridlund, 1994;
Hawk, van Kleef, Fischer, & van der Schalk, 2009; Keltner & Haiddt, 1999, Scherer,
1980, 1988, 1994; van Kleef, de Dreu & Manstead, 2004). The interpretation of affect is
often multi-modal (e.g., facial, gestural, postural, and vocal; Guerro & Floyd, 2006).
However, it has been suggested that vocal expressions of affect may have general
detectability advantages over the other modalities, because their expression has the ability
to draw attention “omni-directionally and over long distances” (Hawk et al., 2009, pp.
294). Though the other modalities are highly interactive among one another, the purpose
of this study is to determine the relative contribution of vocally produced affect and
socially relevant cues to the interpretation of intent behind spoken language.
The interpretation of intent is highly interactive and may be greatly affected by
the influence of non-linguistic information on language (i.e., meaning or purpose behind
the affective expression), as it interacts with the peripheral affect cues. There has been
some suggestion that paralinguistic and linguistic content are processed independently of
each other, suggesting affect is added noise that will only hinder the encoding of the
linguistic information (Forster, 1979; McClelland & Elman, 1986). However, individuals
are faced with a great deal of variability in conversational settings on a regular basis and
may in fact preserve all possible cues to form “exemplar based representations” that
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promote perception and aid production (i.e., as cited in Nygaard & Queen, 2008). Much
of the research evaluating psycholinguistic processing has been well established, but has
often missed the important paralinguistic cues to affective intent.
Nygaard and Lunders and Nygaard and Queen (2002), on the other hand, have
found that individuals have better memory for words spoken with affective intonation.
Halberstadt, Niendenthal, and Kushner (1995) also found that individuals are faster at
making lexical decisions when affective information is congruent with a spoken word. In
fact, affective prosody may provide important cues that allow interlocutors to
disambiguate speech and understand language (Martinez-Castilla & Peppe, 2008; Morton
& Trehub, 2001). Unfortunately, many of these studies have limited their analyzes to
single word processing, and have not fully regarded the role of affective prosody during
more meaningful exchanges of language.
Traditionally, vocally produced affect has been evaluated based on the aggregated
acoustic correlates across many talkers during the production of single word utterances
(e.g., Banse & Scherer, 1996; Barchorowski, 1999; Scherer, 2003). Evaluating affective
speech in this manner has been done this way for practical reasons. These practical
reasons have been equated to the assumptions that during language production, 1) only a
single word is likely to carry the majority of the affective prosodic variation, and
measurement of the other words will dampen the effects of prosodic variation, and 2)
there is a universal way in which all talkers will produce affective speech (Barchorowski,
1999).
A single word in an utterance may carry a greater degree of affective prosody, but
the surrounding words may also have prosodic markers necessary to decode the most
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expressive word in the statement (e.g., comparing featural information held in the precategorical acoustic sensory store [PAS]; Crowder & Morton, 1969; Macmillan &
Creelman, 2005; Macmillan, Goldberg, & Braida, 1988). Therefore, it is unlikely that
prosodic variation of a single word is sufficient for listeners to decode intent behind a
speaker’s statement. It is also unlikely that all talkers will produce affect in the same
manner. Talkers vary based on biological and culturally learned constraints that could
influence the expression of affect (Hawk et al., 2009). Thus, the traditional method of
aggregating acoustics for single words often does not account for the richness in a signal,
individual talker variability or socially related factors that may drive perception (as seen
in a review by Barchorowski, 1999). Much of interactive language is far richer than
single word utterances and having an understanding of the rich psycholinguistic,
paralinguistic and socially relevant interaction is necessary to appropriately interpret
social discourse (Attardo et al., 2005).
It should be considered that the interpretation of intent often goes beyond a single
word, and its explicit meaning. Discourse often has embedded meanings, that require
decoding of paralinguistic information to facilitate a correct response. Communication is
often layered with affective information that is produced by psycholinguistic and
paralinguistic cues that promote socially acceptable behavioral responses and the
understanding of hidden meanings (Nygaard & Lunders, 2002). More specifically,
changing the prosodic variation of many of the words in the statement “How are you
doing?” may denote a number of interpretations, which may be greatly influenced by
social factors. At face value, this statement may be a general, polite greeting that often
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exists in the English language, but changing the prosodic variation of the words within
the statement may change the overall interpretation of what the speaker is “really” saying.
For example, if a person says, “How are you doing” in a friendly tone of voice,
then there may be a number of prosodic markers for each of the words that allow the
listener to decode what was intended. If the listener perceives the speaker as nonthreatening and approachable, then the listener may respond accordingly to decrease
social distance. However, if a person says, “How are you doing?” in a flirtatious or
sexual manner, the words in this statement will be marked by different prosodic markers
than the polite tone of voice, thus changing the intent behind the statement. If sexual
innuendo is perceived, there are a number of considerations the listener will make that
will go beyond the words used, including affective tone of voice and socially related
factors. If the listener perceives the cues as socially unacceptable or unwanted, because
he/she does not identify with the talker or find them attractive (e.g., the talker is 40 years
older than the listener) then the response may be disgust or uneasiness, which may
increase social distance. However, if the talker and listener identify quite well with each
other on a number of social factors (e.g., age, gender and attractiveness), then the listener
might respond to the talker’s statement in a more positive manner, which may decrease
social distance. Both the talker and listener must be aware of the appropriate social
contexts when using affective speech. If they are not, then social conflict may arise that
may subsequently increase social distance. Therefore, it is of particular importance for
speakers to use appropriate cues, in hopes that the listener will properly integrate the
relevant cues during the interpretation of intent.
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The exchange of language and prosody during social contexts provide rich cues
that help individuals relay information with ease. The acceptance and implementation of
such cues allows for survival within the group, by strengthening group cohesion (Kraut &
Johnson, 1979). Not only is the social being required to respond in a socially acceptable
manner, but s/he may also bring his/her own “social baggage” into the interpretation of
intent. That is, a person’s internal representations may highly affect how they interpret
the behaviors of others. Subsequently, social factors may be directly related to the
interpretation of intent, especially if individuals must decode information that is socially
relevant or salient to them. Therefore the purpose of the current study is to evaluate the
effects of talker variability on the interpretation of intent. The first study will evaluate the
production of affective acoustic correlates between and within different talkers. It is
likely that there will be evidence of a great deal of talker variability. The purpose of the
second experiment is to determine if listeners still have the ability to decode intent, even
if there is a great deal of talker variability in the production of affect.
Experiment 1: Production Study
Scherer (2003), among others, has evaluated cues related to affective expressions
by examining the related acoustic correlates. Some prosodic cues used to communicate
affective meaning beyond literal language are related to pitch, speech rate, and intensity
(e.g., Banse & Scherer, 1996; Barchorowski, 1999; Hammerschmidt & Jurgens, 2007;
Juslin & Laukka, 2001, 2003; Mozziconacci, 2001; Pittman & Scherer, 1993; Scherer,
1986). Acoustic features provide an extra source of information about the affective nature
of an utterance (Scherer, 2003). These measures are most common within the affective
speech literature, but researchers have also evaluated other measures related to F0 and
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amplitude (e.g., jitter: frequency perturbation, and shimmer: amplitude perturbation;
Barchorowski, 1999; Scherer, 2003). Generally, global trends of acoustic cues are
reported for basic emotions (e.g., vocal joy: an increase in intensity, pitch and duration).
This description provides insight into the acoustic makeup of a specific basic affective
category, but the description does not provide information about individual talker
variability and other affectively related expressions.
The lack of individual cue variability for even the most basic affective expressions
prevents a further analysis and implementation of possible cue interactions during
perception. The purpose of the production study is to evaluate the tendency to produce
vocal affective prosody that may be equivalent and/or different between talkers. If talkers
produce affective prosody similarly within specific categories, this might suggest there is
a “universal” way in which talkers produce affective speech. As stated above, it is more
likely that talkers produce affective prosody differently, because of biological and learned
cultural constraints related to affect expression (Hawk et al., 2009). If there is a great deal
of talker variability, this might suggest that individuals may use different combinations of
acoustic cues to produce a specific affect category, much like an affective vocal
“fingerprint.” Therefore, it is important to consider that there is a great deal of talker
variability in affect expression, which may or may not include systematic acoustic
patterns for specific affective categories.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-five residents of the city of Memphis, with varying social dialects
volunteered for participation (21 females, 4 males; mean age: 23.72 years). Each
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participant was a native speaker of American English, with varying southern dialects and
no diagnosed speech or hearing impairments.
Materials
The talkers were placed at a comfortable viewing distance from a 20inch iMac
computer screen. A stand-alone microphone was placed directly in front of each talker
and was used to collect auditory recordings.
Stimuli
Traditionally, single syllable/word utterances have been used in similar
production studies, for practical reasons (as noted by Barchorowski, 1999). As stated
above, it has been suggested that only a single word in a sentence will carry the affective
prosodic variation, therefore the reduction of the number of vocally produced utterances
will provide a platform for a cleaner acoustic analysis (Barchorowski, 1999). However, it
should be noted that sentence-long utterances during conversation often go beyond single
word utterances, and therefore should be considered in terms of the overall
communicative utility of the affective cues related to each word production within the
span of the sentence. Therefore, the purpose of the production study is to determine if
there are clear acoustic cues that may separate affective categories that are tied to
sentential meaning to be later used in a perception and action study.
Thus, stimuli included ten statements normed for neutrality (see Table 6, Seibert
& Ellis, 1991), and four affective categories (Compassion, Innuendo, Irritation, and
Neutral).
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Table 6
Normed Neutral Statements Chosen from the Seibert & Ellis (1991) Study.
Production Study Statements

Perception Study
Statements

1. Apples are harvested in the Fall.
2. Most high schools have a band.
3. Elephants carried the supplies

*

4. You have to take the ferry to get to the island.

*

5. The Pacific Ocean has fish.

*

6. Perennials bloom every year.
7. There are sixty minutes in one hour.

*

8. Most oil paintings are done on canvas.

*

9. The Shakers invented the circular saw.
10. It snows in Idaho.

The four affective expressions were chosen because they represented a span of
positive, negative and neutral affects. Innuendo was specifically chosen because it is
inherently more pragmatic than the basic affective expressions (i.e., Compassion,
Irritation and Neutral). More categories have been used in previous pilot studies, but the
chosen categories proved to be the most salient categories. An image was then selected,
via Google images, which matched each statement by affective expression (see Figure 9
for examples of those images). A filler statement (“How are you doing?”) to be spoken in
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only a neutral tone of voice was also used/collected for the purposes of follow-up
questioning at the end of the perception and action experiment (see description below).

Figure 9. A sample of the affective images chosen to help prime the speaker with the
affective intent during the production study (Note: the images presented represent only
one of the statements by the four affective connotations and this statement was retained
for the perception task).

Norming Study. Each of the images paired with the statement by affective
expression were then presented to paid participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (an
online system that pays individuals to complete various types of data entry tasks) to be
normed for within category representation. Participants were asked: “How well could you
say this sentence, in this tone of voice, while looking at this image?” Fifteen Mechanical
Turk users rated each of the images on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very well to 5= not
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very well at all). Each of these ratings was submitted to a reliability analysis and the
intraclass correlation was evaluated (mean rating = 2.07; ICC = .921 for all images, high
ICCs represent within category representation; Russ, Gur, & Bilker, 2008). The results
from the reliability analysis suggest that each of the images chosen fit well within the
category expected. These images were retained for the production study (see below for
description).
Procedure
The talkers were separately and randomly presented with each of the 10
statements by affect expression by image, plus the filler statement via a Matlab
PsychToolBox-3 program (Brainard, 1997). Specifically, stimulus presentation included
an affect-inducing picture, to help prime the talker with the affective expression to be
spoken. Text labels and statements were presented above and below each image (see
Figure 10 for an example). The talker was asked to make note of the expression, view the
image and read the statement silently. Once the talker felt comfortable with the affect
label, statement and image, s/he was instructed to vocally produce that statement. Each
stimulus was presented twice, to ensure all statements by affective expressions were
recorded (just in case a participant accidentally transitioned into the next trial before s/he
recorded their statement). The talker was asked to clearly produce a total of 82 statements
(10 statements x 4 expressions: Compassion, Innuendo, Irritation, & Neutral, and the
filler statement twice), based on his/her own interpretation of the expression. Each
statement was recorded at a 44.1kHz, 16-bit CD quality, sampling rate.
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Figure 10. Sample screen that participants in the production task viewed.

There was a total of 25 talkers, but there was not an equal number of males and
females. Therefore, to equally match gender, the researchers decided to reduce the
number of talkers evaluated in the acoustic analysis, because these talkers would be
retained for the perception study. Upon evaluation of the male talkers, only 2 of the male
talkers were noticeably expressive (i.e., the other two were relatively monotone),
therefore the 2 most expressive females and 2 most expressive males (4 talkers) were
chosen and retained for further analysis. Each of the talkers produced a total of 82
statements (80 Affect x Statement, and 2 filler statements). Since each statement by
expression had two productions, the most expressive productions for the affect by
statement combinations was chosen for each talker, resulting in a total of 41 statements
per talker. These statements were then evaluated further, in order to reduce the number of
productions to be retained for a perception study. The statements that had the most
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overlap between talkers, in terms of expressivity of the production, were retained. This
resulted in a total of 21 statements per talker (i.e., 20 experimental productions and 1
filler retained for the follow-up questions; see Table 6 for the statements retained and
subjected to further acoustic analysis: the asterisked statements 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8, but not
the filler statement). Each of the retained statements was then equated for average RMS
amplitude across talkers before the acoustic analysis. This was done primarily for the
perception task (discussed below), to provide a stable and comfortable listening level to
the listening participants. Since participants in the perception task were presented with
these amplitude-equated stimuli, the acoustic analysis (discussed below) included these
stimuli. Equating for RMS amplitude of the retained productions was an important step
taken before the acoustic analysis (discussed below), because centroid values were
retained for a prediction model with the perception in action data (discussed below).
Results
Acoustic Discriminant Function Analysis
A discriminant function analysis was used to determine if the talkers’ chosen
affective expressions differed on a set of five acoustic characteristics (duration, jitter,
shimmer, F0, and amplitude). Acoustic values were obtained via Praat, a synthesis and resynthesis speech software (Boersma & Weenink, 1992). Duration was sampled at .025sec
time stamps over the entire voiced production, with the pitch and loudness measures
collected at each step. For the pitch measures, jitter (i.e., frequency perturbation) and F0
points (fundamental frequency, lowest frequency of a complex sound) were obtained.
Upon evaluation of each of these measures collected, visual inspection of F0 resulted in
outlier removal of any values above 500Hz and below about 90Hz. F0 values were then
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normalized across talkers, in order to account for biological aspects of pitch production
(e.g., size of vocal chords between males and females). Norming involved taking the
average F0 for the female talkers, and adding that value to each of the males F0 values at
each duration time step. Loudness measures, shimmer (i.e., amplitude perturbation) and
amplitude (in dB SPL), were also collected at each of the duration time stamps. Each of
these measures was then subjected to a discriminant function analysis (DFA), resulting in
16 groups (i.e., 4 Talkers x 4 Affective Expressions; e.g., Female1_Compassion,
Female2_Compassion, Male1_Compassion, Male2_Compassion, etc.).
Multivariate analyses revealed that the first four functions reliably differentiated
the four affective expressions for each talker [function 1: " = .714, #2(75) = 2211.402, p
< .001, R2c = .228; function 2: " = .924, #2(56) = 516.256, p < .001, R2c = .050; function
3: " = .970, #2(39) = 200.041, p < .001, R2c = .023; function 4: " = .993, #2(24) = 47.29,
p < .001, R2c = .004; see Figure 11 for a 3-D depiction of the acoustic space]. The four
functions accounted for 78.6, 13.2, 6.3, and 1.2 %, respectively, of the between talker
expression variability. The standardized and structure coefficients revealed that normed
F0 (function 1); duration time stamp (function 2); amplitude (function 3), and shimmer
(function 4) contributed to the discrimination of the four affective expressions (see Table
7 for standardized and structure coefficients).
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Figure 11. 3D display of the Talker x Affect separation based on the first three significant
functions for the Acoustic discriminant function analysis (e.g., x-axis = normed F0, y-axis
= duration, and z-axis = amplitude).
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Table 7
Standardized and Structure Coefficients from the Acoustic Discriminant Function
Analysis for the Significant Functions. An Asterisk Indicates the Variable that
Contributes Most to the Talker x Affective Category Separation.
Function

Standardized

Structure

1

2

3

4

duration

.137

.981

.019

.059

jitter

-.144

.143

-.086

-.120

shimmer

-.037

-.049

-.079

.989

amplitude

-.252

.060

1.037

.111

norm F0

1.058

-.107

-.167

.034

duration

.103

.984*

-.025

.066

jitter

-.071

.156

-.116

-.125

shimmer

-.063

-.033

-.130

.938*

amplitude

.141

-.026

.981*

.068

norm F0

.956*

-.118

.220

.028

Posthoc adjusted Bonferroni comparisons for the first acoustic linear discriminant
function (ALDF1; F0) revealed there were significant differences in normed F0 for each
of the affect expressions. For example, Compassion statements had significantly higher
F0 values relative to the other expressions (p < .001). Innuendo was significantly lower in
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F0 relative to the other expressions (p < .001). Also, Irritation was lower in F0 relative to
Compassion (p < .001), but higher in F0 relative to Innuendo and Neutral (p < .001).
Finally, Neutral was lower in F0 relative to Compassion and Irritation, but higher in F0
relative to Innuendo (p < .001).
There were also clear differences between each of the talkers for each affective
expression. For example, Female 1 (F1) used significantly higher F0 for Compassion
responses, relative to all other talkers (p < .001). Female 2 (F2) used higher F0 relative to
F1. However, Male 2 (M2) used significantly lower F0 for Compassion relative to the
other talkers (p < .001), but Male 1 (M1) used lower F0 relative to the two females, but
higher F0 relative to the other male for Compassion statements. Innuendo productions
also revealed that F1 used higher F0 relative to both males, but M1 had lower F0 relative
to all the talkers (p < .001). Also, F2 used higher F0 relative to F1 and M2, and M2 used
lower F0 relative to F1 and M1 (all p < .001). Finally, both females produced higher F0
relative to the males for both Irritation and Neutral (p < .001).
Posthoc adjusted Bonferroni comparisons for ALDF2 (duration) revealed that the
females differed in overall duration of their productions (p < .001). However, further
analysis revealed that Compassion and Innuendo responses were the particular responses
that differed between the female talkers (at least p < .005), but Neutral responses were
different between females (p < .001), males and females (p < .001), but not the males.
Posthoc adjusted Bonferroni comparisons for ALDF3 (amplitude) revealed that
F1 used higher amplitude relative to M1 and F2 (p < .001). F2 used lower amplitude
relative to F1 and M2 (p < .001). M1 used lower amplitude relative to F1 and M2 (p <
.001). Further evaluation revealed M1 had significantly lower amplitude relative to all
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other talkers for Compassion statements (p < .001), but F2 had lower amplitude relative
to M2 for Compassion (p < .001). F1 had higher amplitude relative to M1 and F2 for
Innuendo statements (p < .001). Also, M1 and F2 had lower amplitude relative to M2 for
Innuendo statements (p < .001). F2 used lower amplitude relative to both males for
Irritation statements (p < .05). Finally, M2 used higher amplitude for Neutral statements
relative to F2 and M1 (p < .001).
Finally, post hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons for ALDF4
(shimmer) only revealed differences between 2 talkers. This difference only occurred for
Irritation statements between talkers F1, M1, and M2. Specifically, F1 and M1 had less
shimmer relative to M2 (at least p < .05).
Discussion
The production study revealed that there was some overlap in the acoustic
correlates for some talkers and expressions, but there was also affective category
separation between and within the speakers. This finding suggests that while there may
be some type of global affect marker, other factors may influence the final production.
Though there were some acoustic consistencies, the variability in affective expression
could also be likened to a person-specific affective “fingerprint.” This final outcome may
not represent a clear-cut acoustic category for all talkers and the approach to studying
affective speech production should be evaluated in a more continuous manner.
However, traditional methods of measurement assume that there is a global
manner in which all talkers produce affect in a particular way. It may be that these global
measures are well within the range of effective cues to affective speech, but results from
the current production study suggest that there may not be a systematic manner in which
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talkers will always produce affective speech. Therefore, it should be considered that even
beyond the biological make-up of the individual, cultural learning and dialect might
significantly influence the nature of an affective production and how listeners perceive
such cues (Hawk et al., 2009). The next natural question is, even though there is evidence
that listeners respond optimally to an exemplar-based affective expression and given that
talkers may produce affect differentially, will listeners still be able to use the cue
variation to match affective cues systematically, regardless of the variability between
talkers, for each of the different affect categories?
Experiment 2: Perception and Action Study
Evidence from the literature suggests that listeners have the ability to detect
differences in affective prosody (e.g., Nygaard & Lunders, 2002; Nygaard & Queen,
2008; Scherer, 2003; Scherer & Oshinsky, 1977). Studies evaluating the rate of decoding
affective intent have varied between studies, but overall, the suggestion is that listeners
are usually sufficiently able to categorize affective categories with above chance
performance when the affect cues are represented as global markers of a specific category
(e.g., Banse & Scherer; 2003; Barchorowski, 1999; Hammerschmidt & Jurgens, 2007;
Hawk et al., 2009; Scherer, 2003). However, most of these studies only evaluate the
ability of listeners to decode intent behind single word utterances, which could possibly
miss the interaction between sentential meaning and the interpretation of intent beyond
the literal meaning. Also, many of these studies evaluate affect categorization after
processing has already occurred, which misses the dynamic process at the time of
perception. The purpose of the current study is to determine how well listeners actively
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and dynamically decode affective intent, which has clear prosodic variation, beyond
explicit sentential meaning.
At the time of perception, we evaluated how listeners make their decisions. There
has been some suggestion that there is a perception-action link associated with computermouse movements during learning and language comprehension tasks (Dale, Kehoe, &
Spivey, 2007; Dale, Roche, Snyder, & McCall, 2008; Farmer, Cargill, Hindy, Dale, &
Spivey, 2007). Evidence from psycholinguistic research using computer-mouse
trajectories suggests strong evidence for the continuous flow of information as cognitive
processing unfolds (Spivey, 2007). The patterns of responding via arm trajectories reveal
that cognitive competition is present during processing. The various velocity and
complexity measures obtained from computer-mouse trajectories provide a description
about these processes as responding unfolds.
If participants have the ability to discriminate and correctly categorize affective
information based on prosodic changes between and within talkers, then there should be
sufficient evidence supporting the importance of considering localized, relative to
globalized cues, to affective speech. This will be demonstrated via bodily actions marked
by acoustic cue changes in the signal, which should mirror online cognitive processing of
such information. Also, the evaluation of arm movements during perception should
highlight possible mechanisms behind processing of affective information with language
(Dale et al., 2007). In sum, evaluating action dynamics during the online processing may
provide evidence toward the mechanisms behind the perceptual processing of affective
intent from various talkers.
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Methods
Participants
Participants included 24 undergraduate student volunteers from the University of
Memphis. Each participant was a native speaker of American English with no diagnosed
vision or hearing impairments (mean age = 20.125 years; 19 females).
Materials
The experiment took place in a private laboratory room. An Epson LCD projector
was placed on a 30-inch high table. This projected an Apple Mac mini’s display onto the
wall at the end of the laboratory room (12 ft x 5 ft). The projection screen was
approximately 5.5 feet in width (29.1° visual angle). The participant was positioned
behind the LCD projector table, approximately 8ft. away from the projection. A Nintendo
Wii-remote was used as a wireless, arm-extended pointing device (i.e., very much like a
wireless mouse that allows for less constrained arm movements) by having it
communicate with a computer equipped with the Bluetooth transfer protocol. At the base
of the projection screen was a Nyko infrared emitter. Like the Wii console’s sensor, this
provided the Wii-remote a frame of reference for computing cursor position and a
Macintosh framework called DarwiinRemote (copyright 2006, Hiroaki Kimura)
accomplished the interfacing. A Matlab PsychToolbox-3 program controlled stimulus
presentation and participant response collection.
Stimuli
Stimuli included the statements that were equated for average RMS amplitude,
chosen from the production study (see description above).
Procedure
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Participation included a categorization task that assessed the contribution of
affective prosody to the perception of intent. Participants were not given explicit
instructions on how to determine intent. The categorization task was comprised of 4
blocks of trials. Blocks 1, 2 and 3 included randomly presented statements from each
talker, but the button locations changed per block (i.e., top, bottom, left & right
respectively; Block 1: Neutral, Compassion, Innuendo, Irritation; Block 2: Irritation,
Innuendo, Neutral, Compassion; Block 3: Compassion, Innuendo, Neutral, Irritation).
Participants were also permitted to take a brief rest break between blocks to reduce
fatigue effects. During the span of the experiment, participants received a total of 480
trials [160 trials per block; 5 statements x 4 expressions (Compassion, Innuendo,
Irritation, and Neutral) x 6 stimulus repetitions x 4 speakers (F1, F2, M1, M2)]. Stimuli
were played over a headset and responses were made via a Wii-remote click on a virtual
button display, projected onto a wall, which corresponded to the perceived target
expression. The expression response categories were divided into 4 regions to allow a
larger region of measure for arm movements while the participant made their responses
and the button locations changed per block (e.g., the Compassion button was not always
at the bottom of the screen; see Figure 12 for response display).
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Figure 12. Example of the virtual button display participants viewed and interacted in
during the perception task.

Arm movement measures were collected during online processing of responses
and included x-flips, x_100-400msec, y-flips, y_100-400msec, distance and reaction
time. X-flips represent flipping arm direction along the x-axis (e.g., zig-zag pattern).
X_100-400msec refers to the cursor position along the x-axis during the first 100, 200,
300, and 400msec of stimulus onset, to represent when and if participants started moving
towards a response option. Y-flips and y_100-400msec are similar to x-flips and x_100400msec, but the data came from the y-axis. Distance refers to the total area of movement
within the screen in pixels. Reaction time was measured in milliseconds, to represent how
long it took participants to make their response. Each of these measures represents
varying forms of complexity that could represent indecision or certainty (i.e., distance, x
& y-flips), as well as the time course of perceptual processing (i.e., reaction time, x_100400 & y_100-400). Specifically, hesitation during a response action may result in a larger
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number for x-flips, y-flips and distance, representing more indecision. Shorter reaction
times may indicate that listeners are readily and actively processing the acoustic
information, especially if reaction time is shorter than the overall production of the
statement. If there is evidence of movement on the x and y coordinates within the first
400msec of dynamic statement, this suggests that affect is being processed early on in the
perceptual process. Each of these variables together will provide information about the
nature of the perceptual processing of the affective statements.
Finally, Block 4 was much shorter than the first three blocks, which required
participants to make judgments regarding the identity of the talker. Questions were asked
in order to verify that participants were aware of external talker cues that may have
influenced how they responded to each of the talkers’ expressions. Specifically, the
listeners were presented with the filler statement (Neutral “How are you doing?”, to give
them a frame of reference and were asked 4 questions per talker in the following order
[the talker was randomly presented for each question]): 1) Perceptual Expressiveness
(How expressive was this talker?; 1 = very to 5 = not at all), 2) Perceptual Identity: (Does
this talker speak like you do? (1 = very to 5 = not at all), 3) Talker Gender: What is the
gender of this talker?; 1 = female, 2 = male), and 4) Talker Race: (What is the
race/ethnicity of this talker?; 1 = African American, 2 = Caucasian, 3 = Hispanic, 4 =
Asian, 5 = Mixed). Only Perception Expressiveness, Perceptual Identity and Talker
Gender were retained for analysis, because it was thought that Perceptual Identity better
represented social identity than Talker Race. Therefore, Talker Race was never evaluated.
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Results
Identification Task
Target Intent Mixed Fixed/Random Effects Model. A 4 (Talker: F1, F2, M1,
M2) x 4 (Affective Expression: Compassion, Innuendo, Irritation, Neutral) x 3 Block (1,
2, and 3) mixed fixed/random effects model with Talker, Affective Expression and
Subject held as a random factors was used to evaluate the proportion of target intent
responses (i.e., the category the talker intended to produce). Talker and Affective
Expression were held as fixed effects to test their levels, but also held as random factors
because we did not sample all possible talkers or affective expressions. The type III test
of fixed effects revealed a significant main effect of Talker [F(3, 48.844) = 72.631, p <
.001; see Figure 13a for means and standard errors] and Affect Expression [F(3, 69.842)
= 11.293, p < .001; see Figure 13b for means and standard errors] as well, as a Block x
Affect Expression [F(6, 11,104) = 5.942, p < .001; see Figure 13c for means and standard
errors] and a Talker x Affective Expression interaction [F(9, 222.457) = 18.121, p < .001;
see Figure 13d for means and standard errors] for the proportion of target intent
responses.
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Figure 13. Means and standard errors for the a) main effect of Talker, b) main effect of
Affect and c) Talker x Affect interaction.

Post hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons for the main effect of Talker
revealed that F2 received a significantly lower proportion of target responses relative to
all other talkers (p < .001). The results also revealed that M1 received significantly lower
target responses relative to F1 and M2 (p < .001). The pair wise comparisons for the main
effect of Affect revealed that Compassion and Innuendo statements received significantly
fewer target intent responses relative to Neutral (p < .005), and Compassion statements
also received significantly fewer target responses relative to Irritation (p < .005).
Post hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons for the Block x Affect
Expression interaction revealed that Compassion and Innuendo statements were
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significantly lower during Block 1 relative to Block 3 (at least p < .05). Also, there were
significantly fewer target intent responses for Compassion statements from Block 1 to
Block 2 (p < .05). Finally, Neutral statements received a significantly higher proportion
of target responses in Block 1 relative to both Blocks 2 and 3 (p < .05 and .005,
respectively).
Post hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons for the Talker x Affect
Expression interaction revealed that M1 received significantly lower target intent
responses for Compassion relative to all talkers (at least p < .01) and F2 received fewer
target intent responses relative to talker F1 and M2 (p < .001). Also, for Innuendo
statements, F1 received significantly more target intent responses relative to all other
talkers (at least p < .05) and F2 received significantly less target responses relative to all
other talkers (p < .001). For Irritation responses, F2 received significantly fewer target
intent responses relative to all other talkers (p < .001), and F1 received significantly more
target response relative to M1 and F2 (p < .001). Finally, for Neutral responses F2
received significantly fewer target intent responses relative to M1 and M2 (p < .001).
Social Identity Regression Model for Accuracy. A linear regression was used to
determine if the Talker (F1, F2, M1, M2), Affect (Compassion, Innuendo, Irritation and
Neutral), Block (1, 2, 3), Perceptual Expressiveness (how expressive the talker was
perceived to be), Perceptual Identity (how much the listener perceived the talker to match
their own speaking style), Talker Gender, and Acoustic Centroid 1 (pitch), 2 (duration), 3
(amplitude), 4 (shimmer), and Talker*ID (Dummy coded Talker with Centered ID) could
predict the proportion of target intent responses from participants. The results from the
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linear regression suggest that at least some of the predictors could significantly predict
target intent responses [Wii ldf1: F(13, 11,506) = 135.001, p < .001; R2= .135].
Upon further evaluation of the coefficients, the results suggest that all variables
except block could significantly predict accuracy levels (all p < .001, but Perceived
Identity p < .05). Specifically, the results suggest that for every unit increase in Talker
there was a .067 increase in target intent responses. However, the increase in accuracy is
not surprising, because F1 (received the most accurate responses) and M2, both received
much higher levels of accurate responses relative to F2 and M1. So, it is clear that Talker
characteristics were related to levels of accuracy during the perception task. For every
unit increase in Affect there was a .127 increase in target intent responses. Also, this
result provides another way of evaluating the effect of Affect, in that Compassion
statements received much lower levels of accurate target intent responses. Overall, the
results from Talker and Affect further support the findings from above.
In terms of the social identity characteristics, the results also suggested that for
Perceived Identity (1 = very to 5 = no at all), there was a .016 increase in target intent
responses. For DF2*CID, there was a .037 decrease in accuracy. For DM1*CID, there
was a .048 increase in accuracy. For DM2*CID, there was a .067 increase in accuracy.
This suggests that, for the listeners who identified less with the talker, in terms of being
matched for speaking style, accuracy slightly increased relative to F1. However, upon
further evaluation of the interaction terms, the results suggest that lower levels of
perceived identity were more related to lower levels of accuracy for F2. These results
suggest that perceived identity, as a predictor may have hindered accuracy levels for F2,
but not the other talkers. Talker Gender also influenced responding, and for every unit
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increase in Talker Gender (Male to Female) there was a .065 increase in target intent
responses. This might suggest that the gender of the talker may have made it easier for
the listener to categorize intent, however, the higher levels of accuracy may have inflated
the higher proportion of target intent responses for F1.
The acoustic centroids from the DFA from the production study also predicted
accuracy levels. For every unit increase in AC1 (pitch) there was a .262 increase in target
intent responses. For every unit increase in AC2 (duration) there was a .177 increase in
target intent responses. For every unit increase in AC3 (amplitude) there was a .323
increase in target intent responses. For every unit increase in AC4 (shimmer) there was a
.067 increase in target intent responses. This suggests that the variation in acoustic cues
were related to accuracy levels, which might suggest that acoustics are very helpful in
determining intent. For every unit increase in Perceived Expressiveness, there was a .008
decrease in target intent responses. This suggests that as expressiveness was less salient,
there was a decrease in accuracy levels.
Wii Trajectory Analysis for Correct Responses
Wii Mixed Fixed/Random Effects Model. A 4 Talker (F1, F2, M1, M2) x 4
Affect Expression (Compassion, Innuendo, Irritation, Neutral) x 3 Block (1, 2, 3) mixed
fixed/random effects model with Talker, Affective Expression, and Subject held as a
random factors was used to evaluate reaction time, x-flips, y-flips, distance, x_100-400
and y_100-400. The type III test of fixed effects revealed significant main effects for
Talker, Affective Expression, Block and Talker x Affect Expression, Talker x Block and
Affect x Block interactions for reaction time, distance, x-flips (all p < .05). There were
also significant main effects of Talker and Block, as well as Talker x Affect, Talker x
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Block, Affect x Block and Talker x Affect x Block interactions for y-flips (all at least p <
.005). Finally, there was a significant effect of Block for x_300, x_400, y_100 and y_200,
as well as a significant Affect x Block interaction for x_400 (all at least p < .05). Each of
the variables that were significant in this model was retained for a DFA (see Table 8 for
F and p-values).

Table 8
F and p-values for Main Effects and Interactions for the Wii Data from the Mixed
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AxB
***

n.s.

***

n.s

*

168.113

**

n.s
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***
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*
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8.463
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20.394

*
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*
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39.416
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xflip
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Fixed/Random Effects Model.
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57.233

***

(T)
Affect (A)
n.s.
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y_100
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x_300

yflip

***

Talker(T)

Fixed/Random Effects Model.

Note: p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001***

Reaction time. Post hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons were used to
evaluate each of the main effects and interactions for reaction time. The evaluation of
Talker revealed that F2 had significantly longer reaction times relative to all other talkers,
and M1 had significantly longer reaction times relative to F1 and M2 (all at least p < .01).

109

The pair wise comparisons for Affect revealed significantly longer reaction times for
Compassion (p < .05) and Innuendo (p < .005) statements relative to Irritation statements.
The pair wise comparisons for Talker x Affect revealed that for Compassion
statements, reaction time was significantly longer for M1 relative to all other talkers (at
least p < .01). Similarly, Compassion statements received longer reaction times for F1
relative to F2, but shorter reaction times for F2, relative to M1 (p < .01). Innuendo
statements received longer reaction times for F2, relative to all other talkers (p < .001)
and F1 had significantly shorter reaction times relative to all other talkers (p < .001).
Irritation statements for F2 has significantly longer reaction times relative to all other
talkers (p < .001) and M1 had significantly lower reaction times relative to F1 (p < .001).
Neutral statements, for F1 had significantly shorter reaction times relative to M1 and M2,
but F2 had significantly longer reaction times relative to both male talkers (all p < .001).
The pair wise comparisons for the Talker x Block interaction revealed that during
Blocks 1, 2 and 3, F2 had significantly longer reaction times relative to all other talkers
(all p < .001), and F1 had significantly shorter reaction times relative to M1 (all at least p
< .05).
Finally, the pair wise comparisons for the Affect x Block interaction revealed that
for both Blocks 1 and 2, Compassion and Innuendo statements had longer reaction times
relative to Irritation statements (at least p < .05). Also, Neutral statements had
significantly shorter reaction times during Block 1 relative to Compassion and Innuendo
(at least p < .001).
Distance. Post hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons for the main effect
of Talker revealed that F2’s statements were marked by more distance (in pixels) relative
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to all other talkers (p < .001) and M1’s statements were marked by a larger distance
relative to F1 and M2 (p < .001). The pair wise comparisons for Affect revealed that
Compassion statements had a larger distance covered relative to Irritation statements (p <
.05). The main effect of Block revealed that statements in Block 1 received a larger
distance of coverage, relative to both Blocks 2 and 3 (p < .001).
Post hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons for the Talker x Affect
interaction revealed that for Compassion statements, there was less distance covered for
F1’s statements relative to all other talkers (at least p < .05), but more distance for M1,
relative to all other talkers (at least p < .005). For Innuendo statements, F1 was marked
by less distance relative to all other talkers (p < .001), but F2 was marked by an increase
in distance relative to all other talkers (p < .001). For Irritation statements, F2 was
marked with a larger distance covered relative to all other talkers (p < .001). Finally,
Neutral statements for F1 and F2 had a larger difference covered relative to M2, but F1
also had a larger distance covered relative to M1 (all at lease p < .05).
Post hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons for the Talker x Block
interaction revealed that for Block 1, both M1 and F2 had significantly larger distances
covered relative to F1 and M2 (all p < .001). For Block 2, F1 had significantly less
distance covered relative to all talkers (at least p < .05), but F2 had significantly more
distance covered relative to all other talkers (p < .001). For Block 3, F2 had significantly
more distance covered relative to all other talkers (p < .001) and M1 had significantly
more distance covered relative to F1 (p < .05).
Post hoc adjusted Bonferonni pair wise comparisons for the Affect x Block
interaction revealed that Compassion and Innuendo statements for Block 1 received a
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larger distance covered relative to Neutral (all at least p < .05), and Compassion
statements also received a larger distance covered relative to Neutral for Block 2 (p <
.05). Compassion and Innuendo responses were also marked by an increase in distance
relative to Irritation in Block 2 (p < .05)
X-flips. Post hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons for the main effect of
Talker revealed that F2 received significantly more x-flips relative to all other talkers (p <
.001) and M1 had more x-flips relative to F1 (p < .05). Affect comparisons revealed
Compassion and Innuendo responses had significantly more x-flips relative to Irritation
and Neutral (p < .001). Block comparisons revealed that Block 1 had significantly more
x-flips relative to Blocks 2 and 3, and Block 2 had more x-flips relative to Block 3 (all p
< .001).
Post hoc pair wise comparisons for the Talker x Affect interaction revealed that
M1 had significantly more x-flips for Compassion statements relative to all other talkers
(at least p < .05). F1 had significantly fewer x-flips for Innuendo statements relative to all
other talkers (p < .001), but F2 had significantly more x-flips for both Innuendo and
Irritation relative to all other talkers (p < .001). M1 had significantly more x-flips for
Irritation relative to F1 (p < .05). F1 and F2 had significantly more x-flips for Neutral
statements relative to M2, but F2 also had significantly more x-flips relative to M2 (all p
< .001).
Post hoc pair wise comparisons for the Talker x Block interaction revealed that F2
had significantly more x-flips during Block 1 relative to all other talkers and M1 also had
significantly more x-flips relative to F1 and M2 (all at least p < .05). F2 had significantly
more x-flips during Blocks 2 and 3, relative to F1 and M2 (p < .005).
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Post hoc pair wise comparisons for the Affect x Block interaction revealed that
when Innuendo and Irritation response options were on the x-axis and Neutral and
Compassion response options were on the y-axis (Block 1) Irritation received
significantly fewer x-flips relative to all other expressions (at least p < .05). Innuendo
responses also received fewer x-flips relative to Compassion and Neutral responses (p <
.001). Overall, Compassion responses received significantly more x-flips relative to all
other expressions. When Irritation and Innuendo response options were on the y-axis and
Compassion and Neutral response options were on the x-axis, there were significantly
more x-flips for Innuendo and Irritation statements relative to Compassion and Neutral,
but Innuendo statements received significantly more x-flips than all other expressions (all
at least p < .005). When Compassion and Innuendo response options were along the yaxis and Irritation and Neutral response options were along the x-axis, Compassion and
Innuendo received significantly more x-flips relative to Irritation and Neutral (all p <
.001).
Y-flips. Post hoc adjusted Bonferonni pair wise comparisons for the main effect
of talker revealed that F2 had significantly more y-flips relative to all other talkers and
M1 had more y-flips relative to M1 (all at least p < .005). Block comparisons revealed
that Block 1 had more y-flips relative to Blocks 2 and 3, and Block 2 had more y-flips
relative to Block 3 (all p < .001).
Post hoc adjusted Bonferroni pair wise comparisons of the Talker x Affect
interaction revealed that for Compassion statements, F1 had significantly fewer y-flips
relative to M1 and F2, but M1 had more y-flips relative to M2 (all at least p < .01). For
Innuendo and Irritation, F2 had significantly more y-flips relative to all other talkers (p <
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.001). For Neutral, F1 and F2 had significantly more y-flips relative to M1 and M2 (p <
.001).
Post hoc pair wise comparisons for the Talker x Block interaction revealed that
M2 had significantly fewer y-flips relative to F1 and M1 (p < .005). For Blocks 2 and 3,
F2 had significantly more y-flips relative to all other talkers (all p < .005).
Post hoc pair wise comparisons for the Affect x Block interaction revealed that
when Innuendo and Irritation response options were on the x-axis and Neutral and
Compassion response options were on the y-axis, Innuendo and Irritation received
significantly more y-flips relative to Compassion and Neutral, and Innuendo had
significantly more y-flips relative to Irritation (at least p < .005). When Irritation and
Innuendo response options were on the y-axis and Compassion and Neutral response
options were on the x-axis, Innuendo and Irritation had significantly fewer y-flips relative
to Compassion and Neutral (p < .001). Finally, when Compassion and Innuendo response
options were along the y-axis and Irritation and Neutral response options were along the
x-axis, Compassion and Innuendo had significantly fewer y-flips relative to Irritation and
Neutral (p < .001).
The Talker x Affect x Block comparisons revealed that for Compassion
statements in Block 1, M1 had significantly fewer y-flips relative to all other talkers (p <
.005). Compassion statements in Block 2, F1 had significantly fewer y-flips relative to F2
(p < .01). Compassion statements in Block 3, F1 had significantly fewer y-flips relative to
all other talkers (at least p < .05). Innuendo statements in Block 2, F2 had more y-flips
relative to all other talkers and F2 had more y-flips than F1 and M1 in Block 3 (all at
least p < .005). Similarly, F2’s Irritation statements received more y-flips for both Blocks
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2 and 3 (at least p < .05). For Neutral statements, M2 had fewer y-flips relative to F1 and
F2 during Block 1, and F1 had more y-flips for Neutral statements relative to M1 (at least
p < .005). For Neutral statements in Blocks 2 and 3, F1 and F2 had more y-flips relative
to both male talkers (all at least p < .05).
X_300 & 400. Post hoc adjusted Bonferonni pair wise comparisons for the main
effect of block for both x_300 and x_400 revealed that there was more movement within
the first 300 and 400msec of the statement during Block 3 to Block 1 (p < .001) and to
Block 2 (at least p < .05). The Affect x Block interaction comparisons revealed that
movement within the first 100msec of the statement was faster in Block 3 relative to
Block 1 and Block 2 (both p < .001).
Y_100 & 200. Post hoc adjusted Bonferonni pair wise comparisons for the main
effect of block for both y_100 and y_200 revealed that there was more movement within
the first 100 and 200msec of the statement during Block 3 to Block 1 (p < .001).
Wii Discriminant Function Analysis. A discriminant function analysis was used
to determine if the participants’ arm trajectories for each Talker x Affective Expression x
Block categories differed on the eight significant arm trajectory measures obtained from
the mixed model analysis (reaction time, x-flips, y-flips, distance, x_300, x_400, y_100,
y_200). Each of these measures was then subjected to the DFA, resulting in 48 groups
(i.e., 4 Talkers x 4 Affective Expressions x 3 Blocks; e.g., Female1*Compassion*Block1
or Male1*Compassion*Block1).
Multivariate analyses revealed that the first four functions reliably differentiated
the arm movements for the four affective expressions produced by the four talkers by th
three blocks [function 1: " = .514, #2(376) = 5799.404, p < .001, R2c = 0.12; function 2:
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" = .781, #2(322) = 2148.911, p < .001, R2c = 0.02; function 3: " = .910, #2(270) =
820.510, p < .001, R2c = 0.004; function 4: " = .992, #2(220) = 263.494, p < .05, R2c =
0.0001; see Figure 14 for a 3-D depiction of the arm trajectory space]. The four functions
accounted for 66.6, 21.1, 8.4 and 1.2 %, respectively, of the between group variability.
The standardized and structure coefficients revealed that x-flips and y-flips (function 1);
x-flips, reaction time, and y-flips (function 2); distance (function 3); and x_400 and
x_300 contributed to the discrimination of the four affective expressions (function 4; see
Table 9 for standardized and structure coefficients).

Figure 14. 3D display of the Talker x Affect x Block separation based on the first three
significant functions for the Wii discriminant function analysis (e.g., x-axis = x & y-flips,
y-axis = x-flips, y-flips, reaction time and distance, and z-axis = distance).
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Table 9
Standardized and Structure Coefficients from the Wii DFA for the Significant Functions.
Asterisks Indicate the Contributing Variable for Talker x Affective Category Separation.
Function
1

2

3

4

.208

1.048

-.329

-.459

-.156

-.515

1.069

-.351

x-flips

.874

-.004

.154

.421

Standardized

y-flips

-.893

.235

.007

. 463

Coefficients

x_300

.023

.166

-.200

-1.327

x_400

.006

-.206

.297

2.023

y_100

-.072

-.117

.272

.271

y_200

.082

.086

-.121

.037

reaction time

.086

.899*

.408

-.066

distance

-.056

.206

.955*

-.175

x-flips

.603*

.530*

.435

.142

y-flips

-.500*

.689*

.359

.180

Structure

x_300

.003

-.044

.112

.640*

Coefficients

x_400

.001

-.052

.134

.749*

y_100

-.002

-.044

.155

.326

y_200

.001

-.036

.165

.321

reaction time
distance
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Social Identity Regression Model for Indecision/Complexity Measures. Four
linear regressions were used to determine if the Perceived Expressiveness (how
expressive the talker was), Perceived Identity (how much the listener perceived the talker
matched their own speaking style), Talker (dummy coded: F1, F2, M1, M2), Affect type
(dummy coded: Compassion, Innuendo, Irritation, Neutral), Block (Dummy coded: 1, 2,
3), Talker Gender, Particpant Gender, Acoustic Centroid 1 (normed F0), 2 (duration), 3
(amplitude) and 4 (shimmer) and various dummy coded interaction variabls could predict
the arm trajectory measures during the online processing (the 4 significant Wii LDFs) of
the target intent responses from participants. The various dummy coded interaction
variables included dummy coded Talker (with F2 as the comparison) with Perceived
Expressiveness and Perceived Identity (i.e., as described in the social identity regression
for accuracy). The results suggest all four models had at least one variable that could
predict the Wii ldf values [Wii(x-flip & yflip): F(32,8701) = 139.581, p < .001, R2 = .339;
Wii(x-flip, yflip & reaction time): F(32,8701) = 45.645, p < .001, R2 = .141; Wii(distance):
F(32,8701) = 14.497, p < .001, R2 = .051; Wii(x_400 & x_300): F(32,8701) = 4.313, p < .001,
R2 = .016; see Table 10 for ß and p levels associated with each predictor in the 4
regression models].
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Table 10
ß Values and p Levels for Each Predictor Entered into the Four Wii ldf Regression
Models. (Note: D_ = Dummy Coded Variable; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001).
Wii LDF ß values
Predictor

Ldf 1

Ldf 2

Ldf 3

Ldf 4

Centered Perceived

CExp

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

-.085***

Expressive & Identity

CID

n.s.

.073***

n.s.

n.s.

D_F2

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

D_M1

n.s.

.322***

.197**

n.s.

D_M2

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

D_B1

1.404***

.525***

-.438***

n.s.

D_B2

n.s.

.150*

-.210**

-.207***

D_F2*CExp

n.s.

.167***

n.s.

.146***

Talker x Centered

D_M1*CExp

n.s.

.170***

n.s.

n.s.

Expressive Interaction

D_M2*CExp

n.s.

n.s.

.110***

n.s.

Talker x Centered

D_F2*CID

n.s.

-.174***

.082***

n.s.

Identity Interaction

D_M1*CID

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

.053*

D_M2*CID

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

.090**

Talker x Block 1

DF2*D_B1

.0572***

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

Interaction Term

DM1*D_B1

.170**

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

DM2*D_B1

.142*

-.240***

n.s.

n.s.

Talker

Block
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Table 10
ß Values and p Levels for Each Predictor Entered into the Four Wii ldf Regression
Models. (Note: D_ = Dummy Coded Variable; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001).
Wii LDF ß values
Predictor
Affect

Ldf 1

Ldf 2

Ldf 3

Ldf 4

D_C

1.083***

.175*

n.s.

n.s.

D_IN

1.359***

.249**

n.s.

n.s.

D_IR

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

-.127*

-.838***

.402***

.399***

n.s.

Affect x Block 1

D_C*DB1

Interaction Terms

D_IN*DB1

n.s.

.706***

n.s.

n.s.

D_IR*DB1

-1.520***

.322***

.202**

n.s.

Affect x Block 2

D_C*DB2

-1.224***

.200**

.355***

.217***

Interaction Terms

D_IN*DB2

n.s.

n.s.

.160*

.163*

D_IR*DB2

1.116***

n.s.

n.s.

.204*

AC1(pitch)

n.s.

-.291**

-.277**

n.s.

AC2(duration)

n.s.

-.450***

n.s.

n.s.

AC3(amplitude)

n.s.

n.s.

.343***

n.s.

AC4(shimm)

n.s. -1.815*** -1.359***

n.s.

Acoustic LDFs

Discussion
The results from the Trajectory and ID task analyses speak directly to how the
interpretation of affective intent is perceived. Specifically, it is clear that acoustic
combinations between speakers may differ; yet perception resulted in above chance
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accuracy levels for all speakers and their expressions. This suggests that even when an
acoustic signal is degraded or indistinct, the final production may be related back to an
exemplar-based representation, to which the listener may compare it (Nygaard & Queen,
2008). This also suggests that even though production should be evaluated more
continuously, the perception of affect may be processed completely for within category
matches for particular categories.
Though above chance accuracy responding was obtained, F2 statements were
much lower than the other talkers, indicating that she was much harder to interpret than
the other talkers. Varying levels of accurately identifying intent may speak directly to the
necessity to analyze talker-specific characteristics, rather than global markers of specific
acoustic categories. In that, though above chance accuracy levels may be obtained, the
manner in which listeners perceive such information was different. Therefore, one should
be careful in assuming that exemplar-based matches will always occur. Rather,
understanding talker variability may help address the contexts when affective prosody
fails to be matched to a specific category, and the listener might be required to rely on
repeated repetition of the affect type from the specific talker (e.g., an increase in accuracy
for Compassion responses from Block 1 to Block 3). Therefore, even if a talker is harder
to understand, through learning, a listener may be able to adjust his/her own behavior on
future interactions with that talker. This suggests that while the interpretation of very
salient acoustic cues seems apparent, learning has a role in decoding intent when these
cues fail.
The results from the arm trajectory analysis revealed that, though accuracy levels
were above chance (ID task; consistent with previous studies), these affective statements
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were not processed equally. The results suggest that some affective statements were met
with more indecision and hesitation (e.g., Compassion), which was evident in longer
reaction times, a higher number of x-flips, y-flips, and distance measures. However, as
time progressed, it was clear that the affective acoustics became salient cues to the
listener, which allowed them to begin to process the meaning behind the statement early
on in the perceptual system, relative to post-perceptual categorization (e.g., x_300,
x_400, y_100 & y_200; movement towards a response option before the sound file
finished playing), implying that prosody may be processed with the words in order to
possibly decrease the processing load intent (as opposed to being added noise or being
processed independently, Forster, 1979; McClelland & Elman, 1986). These results
confirm the notion that talker variability should be considered at a more local level,
because listeners will process the signals differentially.
The results from the two regression analyses (ID and Trajectory) also revealed a
number of things about the influence of the acoustic and social cues involved in the
perception of intent. Specifically, the ID regression analysis suggests that a number of
factors predicted accuracy levels (e.g., Talker, Affect, Perceived Identity, Perceived
Expressiveness, and Talker Gender). This suggests that listeners were accessing a number
of cues related to the overall production of affect. Differential processing seemed to occur
depending on the strength of these factors. A similar trend was evident in the trajectory
regressions. The trajectory regressions showed that there were also a number of
predictors of indecision and certainty. Each of the affective categories, by the particular
talker, was met with different levels of indecision. The results do not indicate that
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indecision was based on Talker and/or Affect alone, but rather the acoustics and other
socially related factors such as perceived identity and talker gender.
General Discussion
The visual modality has been suggested to be the most dominant modality for
perception (e.g., Colavita, 1979; Gibson, 1933; Pick, Warren, & Hay, 1969; Posner,
Nissen, & Klein, 1976), but it seems intuitive that the auditory modality has its
advantages in regards to communication (Hawk et al., 2009). Social beings rely on others
for survival, which requires them to be able to respond optimally in varying
communicative settings. There are many ways in which individuals communicate to
decrease social distance, but the current focus is to determine the effects of vocal cues to
the interpretation of intent behind spoken language. Specifically, our analysis looked at 1)
talker variability, 2) the perceived social identity of the listener and 3) possible perceptual
mechanisms behind the interpretation of intent.
These results from the production study suggest that a number of things are
related to the nature of affective expressions. It is clear from Figure 3 that some of the
talkers had overlapping acoustic correlates, suggesting that there may be an acoustic
template used for some expressions. However, the majority of the affective expressions
were produced differently between talkers, which may mark specific acoustic
characteristics that are more localized and may contain talker-specific acoustic patterns.
Since the affective expressions were normed, to account for any biological contributions
of pitch production (e.g., size of vocal tract), one might suggest that these differences
may be directly related to dialect differences, much like dialect differences in language
production. Dialect differences could possibly contribute to the manner in which listeners
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may be able to perceive a wide range of affect related cues to specific categories from
many different people who are closely related to their own cultural group. It may also
account for difficulties individuals have with interpreting intent from individuals who are
greatly separated from their own cultural group (e.g., misunderstanding affect due to
expectations and stereotypes; Bodenhausen & Moreno, 2000; Dijker, 1987; Gilovich,
Savistky, & Medvec, 1998; Miller & McFarland, 1987). However, much like dialect
differences found between language users, it may be necessary for a listener to be able to
identify with these differences. If the listener does not understand the dialect differences
or even similarities because of underlying cultural assumptions, s/he may fail to
recognize the intent behind speaker’s statements. This might suggest that there is not
necessarily a “universal” way in which talkers produce affective speech, but they may
have an “exemplar-based” representations; specific to their own dialect and cultural
beliefs of what each expression may sound like.
Given the range of talker variability, it would be beneficial for listeners to be able
to handle such variability when presented with varying social contexts, especially when
interacting with individuals very close to their own social group. This result may also
indicate that aggregating acoustic cues across listeners does not represent the full range of
possible cue productions between talkers. Therefore, it seems necessary to attempt to
understand the overall variability between individuals and groups during the production
of spoken language. Not considering talker variability by measuring affect in a very
global manner may be problematic, especially for systems that may look to these results
to help develop speech recognition systems. For example, Scherer and Oshinsky (1977)
have suggested that when global cues of affective expressions are synthetically imposed
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onto natural speech, listeners may still be able to correctly categorize the affect
expression. This might suggest that listeners have the ability to adjust to variable speech
signals, which may represent a wider range of interactions with different individuals.
The results from the perception and action study suggest that there is some
variability in the ability of participants to respond to the affect between talkers and
categories. Specifically, Compassion and Innuendo statements, but Compassion much
more so, were much harder for participants to categorize, relative to Irritation and
Neutral. It was clear that all talkers’ Compassion statements received lower levels of
target intent responses, which might suggest that some affective expressions may be
portrayed by other cues that could be heavily related to context, or context may help them
ground all existing cues more accurately. Specifically, under certain types of situations,
when the auditory signal is degraded, the lack of contextual related cues may
subsequently prevent the listener from identifying the intended category, leading to a
misinterpretation/mislabeling of the event. Providing context could alleviate lower levels
of accuracy and future research should evaluate this. However, if rich context cues are
unavailable, listeners may rely on talker specific characteristics to help ground their
perceptions.
For example, talker characteristics seemed to influence accuracy levels between
talkers. Listeners were able to identify the intent behind F1’s statements with higher
accuracy relative to the other talkers. F1 may have provided more salient cues, which
could have been related to social cues and not just the acoustic cues related to the affect
alone. The degree of acoustic saliency (affect or dialect) may have helped or hindered the
overall determination of talker intent, indicating that some talkers were misunderstood
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more often, relative to others. Differences in responding were most evident in responses
to F2, which revealed she was the hardest for listeners to interpret. This suggests that
there was some aspect of her productions that did not provide a higher degree of saliency
as compared to the other talkers. It should be noted, however, that each talker reached
above chance accuracy levels from their listeners’ interpretation of intent (above .25).
This suggests that each listener was able to identify each talker’s statement with a relative
degree of accuracy.
If the acoustics of the affective speech are not always salient, other factors may
help a listener to adapt to the social context. For example, there was also evidence of
learning that seemed to help a listener identify meaning (e.g., increase in accuracy from
Block 1 to 3). This would seem to be quite advantageous when interacting in novel social
situations, in that, a listener may have the opportunity to adapt to novel situations (over
time) during conversation with new individuals, because they are actively learning the
behaviors of others. This may be related to the listener’s ability to make predictions about
behaviors based on adjustments to previously held assumptions about behaviors they
have learned. However, this may make it more difficult and time consuming for listeners
to interact in novel social situations, and more salient cues may be necessary (e.g., more
detailed language, explicit context or more expressive acoustic cues when interpreting
affect from someone from a different country). If that information is not salient initially,
then miscommunication may be more likely to occur. This could cause a level of
frustration during the interaction in novel social experiences with different cultures, but
through learning the cues to possibly incongruous norms, similar trends might emerge.
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Since there were differences in how listeners categorized the affective categories
between and within talkers, this supports the importance of evaluating local cues to
affective speech production. Not all speakers will always effectively get their message
across, resulting in a miscommunication. It is fortunate, that in most social interactions,
there is often a chance for clarification questions that may repair such failures in
production and perception (Clark & Murphy, 1992; Garrod & Pickering, 2004). This may
be extremely important when affective cues fail, and other aspects of the interaction may
help ground the intended meaning. Since clarification questions may be another time
consuming process, listeners may try to access all cues available before reaching a
sufficient interpretation of a speaker’s meaning.
As discussed above, acoustics, talker specific characteristics and socially relevant
dialect cues (i.e., perceived identity and talker gender), contributed to accurate
categorization of intent. The results from the social identity regression for accuracy are
consistent with this assumption. From the previous analysis, there was clear evidence that
different talker’s statements were interpreted differently. The results suggest that
expressiveness, or how participants perceived the overall expressiveness of each talker
predicts accuracy, which suggests that expressivity was useful to the listeners. Also, the
results suggested that as perceived identity increased (i.e., 1 = very to 5 = not at all) then
accuracy increased, but the opposite occurred for F2. This might suggest that identity
may not have been as important as acoustic cues and level of expressiveness, unless the
saliency of the acoustic cues failed to indicate intent. This assumption seems to be
evident in the reduction in accuracy for F2, when lower perceived identity predicted
lower levels of accuracy, in that all cues seemed to fail for F2 relative to the other talkers.
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Talker gender also predicted accuracy in that, if the talker was female, the level of
accuracy was a bit higher, but this interpretation should be considered with care, since
there were significantly fewer male than female listeners and F1 received a higher level
of accurate responses. More interestingly, the acoustic ldfs significantly predicted
accuracy levels, suggesting that accuracy levels are related to perceived acoustic
characteristics, confirming that acoustics matter. Listener’s perception of the acoustic
variation as well as expressivity and perceived identity predicted an increase in accuracy
levels. Thus, it should be considered that social factors might help a listener ground
information from a speaker under sparse contextual situations.
Overall, the results from the accuracy analyses suggest that affect perception,
based on related acoustic cues, may require processing beyond affect cues, which may be
related to socially relevant dialect and possibly even context cues. That is, there may be
specific contexts when the acoustic cues are the only cue necessary for correct
interpretation. However, dialogue and social interactions are not solely acoustic in nature,
rather a listener may capitalize on all information presented to him/her in order to make
the most appropriate response.
The accuracy results support the notion that listeners are adept at interpreting
intent, even under minimal contextual settings. However, these results do not speak to the
nature of perceptual processing. The Wii trajectory analysis, on the other hand, revealed
varying levels of confidence, certainty, indecision and hesitation during the online
processing of these affective expressions. The results from the mixed fixed/random
effects model and DFA suggest that even when listeners correctly categorized the
affective intent, they responded with different levels of confidence for particular talkers
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and affective expressions. Results here provide evidence beyond general categorization
ability, in that it is clear that some affective and talker expressions were met with more or
less indecision, even though they interpreted intent correctly. These results also mirror
the results from the ID data. The statements that were incorrectly categorized more often
were also met with more indecision when listeners were able to identify the intent behind
the speaker’s statement.
The results overall suggest that F2, Compassion and Innuendo statements, but
Compassion more so, and trials during Block 1 were marked more by indecision and
hesitation. This was most evident in the longer reaction time measures, increased
distance, x-flips and y-flips. Specifically, during Block 1, all of these measures were
higher relative to the other blocks of trials. For example, longer reaction times suggest
that the listeners may have been waiting to respond until a salient cue became available.
Also, an increase in distance, x and y flips suggest that participants were not moving the
cursor in a fluid motion towards the correct answer, which has been shown to represent
indecision and hesitation (Dale et al., 2007). This suggests that listeners may have been
searching for specific cues during the entirety of the production that would have
ultimately indicated the intent.
On a more positive note, the other talker’s and affective expressions were met
with a greater amount of confidence and certainty (i.e., Irritation and Neutral). This was
evident in faster reaction times, shorter distance covered and fewer x and y-flips. The
results also indicated that as time progressed (e.g., from Block 1 to 3), participants started
responding much faster. This suggests that the affective cues became more salient and
may have been learned as time progressed. This was an interesting finding, in that the
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identification of target intent is not completely automatic; rather listeners may need time
to appropriately identify talker specific characteristics. These findings further support the
notion that talker specific cues should be taken into consideration, and that global
affective cues are not sufficient to understand how affect is processed between different
talkers.
The Wii LDF regression models that suggest the acoustics produced influence
how listeners will respond to a specific talker and their expressions provided further
support. That is, the more salient the cues were, the more likely the listener was to
respond with confidence (i.e., marked by fewer x-flips, y-flips, faster reaction time, and
less distance). The results are promising, in the sense that they are consistent with
previous studies. F0, amplitude and duration have been the most consistently used
measures to determine specific acoustic patterns of affective speech (Barchorowski,
1999; Hammerschmidt & Jurgen, 2007; Scherer, 2003). This is interesting because, the
more salient cues predicted the confidence in the listener. This also speaks directly to the
notion that affect should not be merely evaluated based on global affective cues, because
the talker does not necessarily produce affect in the same way as someone else.
Interestingly, the perception of expressiveness also predicted how the participant
responded to the intended category. As seen above, expressiveness predicted accuracy
towards the intended category, which further suggests that expressiveness, is also related
to confidence in their response. This suggests that if the listener felt the talker was less
expressive, a less confident response was produced. The result also suggests that if the
talker was perceived to be more expressive, they were more likely to respond with a
higher degree of confidence. Therefore, the results of this section suggest that acoustics,
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expressiveness, identifying with the talker, learning and affect type predict the amount of
confidence that existed during the perception and action on affective expressions between
talkers.
The overarching conclusions here are that affective expressions and talkers may
not be created equally in terms of processing mechanisms. Our ID results are consistent
with previous studies that suggest listeners are relatively accurate in categorizing
affective expressions. The measure of online responses tells a little more about how
listeners do this. Depending on the salience of the cues produced (affective or social), a
listener may have an easier or more difficult time processing these statements. This is an
important aspect to be considered, because a listener may seem to be very good at
determining affect, but it does not mean that they are able to do this in a consistent and
confident way.
This supports the assumption that the use of global affect cues to explain the
production of specific expressions may be insufficient. In the sense that, even though a
great deal of accuracy may be met as a function of categorization, the strength of the
categorical response may be called into question. It is not to say that listeners are good or
accurate, but it should be recognized that interpretation of the cues might be time
consuming and sometimes confusing. Previous studies have attempted to aggregate these
cues, in hopes of determining a particular pattern of cues for these affective categories.
This method of aggregating may not be indicative of even the best and/or most
representative cues produced for those categories. Consistent with our results, the four
talkers evaluated here, have shown a great deal of talker variability in their expressions.
Yet, listeners were relatively accurate in categorizing intent.
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Thus, if the sample of talkers in the other production studies produced affect
inconsistently, their cues were aggregated, and listeners could accurately categorize the
affect, it would only seem natural to assume that there are specific patterns associated
with affect expression. However, the results here suggest that these specific patterns
probably do not exist, because listeners were still able to categorize the affective
statements above chance. Listeners may have arrived at their decisions differently
depending on the expression and the talker. That is, the listener may finally “get it,” but
they may be uneasy if they are unsure of what the cues mean (learning may have helped
resolve some of this). This may require listeners to focus on socially and/or contextually
relevant cues to make the most appropriate response or they may even make the wrong
interpretation. Additionally, it could also suggest that if the listener immediately “gets it,”
the listener may be more readily able to respond and may be more confident in the cues
meaning.
Overall, the results from these experiments suggest that the perception of vocally
produced affect is not simple, and should be evaluated in a more continuous manner. The
results from the categorization task mirror the results from previous studies, but
evaluating the effects of categorical perception during dynamic online processing
revealed that even when a listener is able to decode intent, they still may have a difficult
time doing so. Therefore, realizing that the talker brings a great deal of variability to the
interaction, the listener must grapple with various cues to discern intent. These studies
provide valuable insight into how prosody influences the interpretation of intent that may
have important social implications.
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Though the evidence here suggests that affect may be produced more
continuously, but perceived more categorically, there were a number of limitations to
these studies. Specifically, this task was virtually devoid of context. Therefore,
processing of affective information may happen very differently given a richer context
for listeners to rely on. For example, if the listeners were able to rely on other contextual
cues (e.g., visual environment), then their responses to F2 could have been higher.
Therefore, it would be beneficial to the listener to be able to rely on other cues when the
speaker may not be able to sufficiently provide salient information to them. Future
studies should evaluate richer contextual environments during the online processing of
affective speech when it succeeds and fails.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
There are many cues related to communication during social interactions to relay
information. This dissertation evaluated the effects of priming, adaptation and
interpretation, and provides evidence that many possible cues influence communicative
behavior. There are underlying processing mechanisms that elicit specific types of
behavior during priming, adaptation and interpretation that allow interlocutors to share
and comprehend information. In order to fully engross oneself into a social interaction
successfully, individuals may need to synchronize or possibly de-synchronize with
another’s behavior, and make use of all possible communicative cues available.
Individuals are also often presented with a certain set of difficulties within any given
conversation (e.g., ambiguity, frame of reference, interpretation of paralinguistic cues).
The three main chapters (Chapters 2, 3, & 4) specifically evaluated the effects of priming,
adaptation and interpretation.
In Chapter 2, the paper evaluated the impact of the use of indirect language on
alignment and the influence of mood on such alignment. Experiment 1 looked directly at
the effect of indirect language priming during the course of a pseudo-interaction. Results
from this experiment suggested that participants were highly affected by pragmatic
primes and will readily align their language to coordinate with their partner. A mood
inducing video was then presented to participants in Experiment 2, because pragmatic
information is often presented in the context of affective behavioral cues. It was expected
that mood induction would subsequently change how interlocutors responded during the
pseudo-interaction. The two experiments specifically tested the impact of the use of
indirect language by a pseudo-confederate on participant contributions to interaction.
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Overall, individuals coordinate during interaction at the level of pragmatics
(Experiment 1), and this is not explained merely by mood inducement through the
presence of a double meaning (Experiment 2). Though there is a large literature on
pragmatics in discourse, this paper was the first experimental demonstration of alignment
at the pragmatic level. These findings are consistent with previous research exploring
interactive alignment at other linguistic levels (see Garrod & Pickering, 2004 for a
review). When participants activate their partner’s pragmatic strategy, such as humorous
sarcasm, the probability of responding in a similar way should grow. This was evident in
the Indirect Language (IL) distributions provided by the participants (e.g., participant ILs
increase/decrease when the pseudo-confederate’s IL increase/decreases). This process
may be automatic if the participants were not conscious of why they were mimicking
their partner’s behavior. Interlocutors may not consciously realize that aligning with their
conversation partner could naturally reduce social distance during communication. In
short, when participants were highly primed for these specific pragmatic goals, they were
provided with a now socially acceptable strategy of responding. Priming has an important
impact on behavior in communicative settings and may help interlocutors coordinate
cooperative behaviors. However, many social interactions do not always involve perfect
coordination, and miscommunication often arises. The next study evaluated the effects of
communication breakdown and the strategies used to reduce miscommunication.
Chapter 3 reports a series of studies exploring conditions under which perceived
communication breakdown influences speakers to change their strategies in order to
disambiguate. Experiment 1 required participants to provide instructions about moving
objects around a screen, and were prompted with a visual mistake during an ambiguous
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two-referent pseudo-interaction. There was a significant effect of the visual mistake for
participants who believed they were speaking with a real person. Also, as participants
progressed through the experiment, the vocal productions of the disambiguation
statements decreased in duration. This might suggest, that as the experiment progressed, a
strategy of responding unambiguously may have become increasingly more automatic.
This conclusion was later tested in Experiment 3. Since participants could clearly
recognize a behavioral cue to communication breakdown, Experiment 2 sought to
determine if this recognition could be hindered by cognitive load.
Specifically, Experiment 2 assessed the effect of a visual mistake with an imposed
time pressure on disambiguation. The results suggest that during increased time pressure
or induced cognitive load, interlocutors fail to disambiguate. Overall, participants may
have perceived the breakdown in communication, but cognitive load prevented them
from formulating a disambiguating strategy that could be easily maintained. Therefore,
Experiment 3 evaluated whether or not a speaker’s strategy of disambiguation could be
maintained if they initially had the time to formulate a strategy of responding.
Experiment 3 evaluated the use of disambiguation as a response strategy when the
use of an imposed time constraint was presented during different parts of the experiment.
Participants were placed under time pressure during the first half or the second half of the
experiment. Participants who received the time pressure at the beginning of the
experiment had a difficult time disambiguating their instructions, but quickly began to
disambiguate when the time constraint was removed. Participants who received the time
pressure during the second half of the experiment were able to formulate a response
strategy during the first half that was subsequently maintained when a time pressure was
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imposed. The results from this experiment suggest that cognitive load will, in fact, hinder
a person’s ability to speak unambiguously. However, if the speaker is able to formulate a
strategy early on, cognitive load has less of an effect on disambiguation.
We frame these results in terms of an adaptive, strategic account of audience
design that may integrate two prominent recent theories of how participants deal with
interactive tasks of this kind (i.e., Horton & Keysar, 1996: Monitoring & Adjustment
Model; Galati & Brennan, 2010: One-bit model). The results from this study speak
directly to the effects of visual cues to combat communication breakdown. There are
many cues that interlocutors may use to help them decode meaning behind a speakers
statements, but these cues may not always be related to visual context, rather, the listener
is required to decode meaning within the speech signal that often goes beyond what is
literally stated. The next chapter evaluated the effects of cues within the speech signal
that provided distinct markers of the intended meaning.
Chapter 4 evaluated the effects of talker variability on the interpretation of intent
via production and perception and action study. The production study involved naïve
talkers who produced a number of statements with varying affective connotations.
Acoustic characteristics of each production were measured and analyzed for between and
within group variation. Traditionally, affective production studies tend to aggregate
acoustic measures across talkers, which assume there is a systematic way in which talkers
produce affective categories. However, the results from the production study suggest that
there is a great deal of talker variability in affect production and aggregating the acoustic
correlates may miss the richness in the acoustic signal that may be provided by different
talkers.
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Since there was a large amount of talker variability, the next natural question was
to determine if listeners could accurately decode intent, even though the acoustic signals
were different between talkers. The perception study evaluated this tendency and found
that listeners could identify intent between talkers at above chance levels. These results
were consistent with previous studies, but the true nature of the perceptual processing is
often missed in basic categorical perception paradigms.
This was directly addressed by evaluating categorization during online
processing. Online processing was measured via arm trajectory movements. The results
from this analysis revealed that though the listeners were able to accurately categorize the
intended category, they did not process the affective statements equally. Rather, some of
the statements produced were met with a great deal of indecision and hesitation (e.g.,
F2’s Compassion). This suggests that the categorization of affective speech may not be
that easy, especially when the acoustic signal provides a lower level of acoustic
expressiveness (e.g., perceived expressiveness). Also, there was some indication that
social cues also predicted how confident listeners were in their decisions. Therefore, it
should be noted that when listeners interpret intent behind a speaker’s statements, they
would also consider other factors (such as perceived identity) that may help or hinder
their ability to respond accurately and with confidence.
Regardless of the context individuals are presented, they should be able to
formulate specific strategies to decode information. Though conversation may not be as
coherent as possible, there are methods which individuals employ to clarify
miscommunications, and thus increase the comprehension and flow during conversational
settings. Social coordination has been very well developed from a psycholinguistic
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standpoint, showing that there are specific tactics individuals utilize to create a flowing
social environment. However, this standpoint still lacks the realization of dialogue’s
complexity, because it ignores perlocutionary acts related to intent. Many layers of rich
information are stripped away to reveal the characteristics of simple expressions of
affective behavior. These experiments show the effect of behavioral cues on
communication and how these cues influence an individual’s behavior. These phenomena
have been substantiated, and their effects seem apparent. There is a seemingly obvious
link between priming, adaptation and interpretation as separate but integrative
mechanisms that occur during dialogue. This dissertation provides extensive evidence
that social interactions may not be simply described by specific phenomena; rather they
may reciprocally represent a number of mechanisms that may better explain day-to-day
social interactions. Though these phenomena were studied independently of each other,
future research should attempt to link these mechanisms in a more ecologically valid
manner to better understand the complexity of communication, especially during
dialogue.
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